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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
China's plans to quickly modernize and develop its telecommunications infrastructure have
attracted global attention, from foreign investors eager to enter this huge new market, to
social scientists who wonder what increased access to communications technology will mean
for the world's most populous nation. Despite the government's recognition of the strategic
importance of telecommunications and the high growth rate in the sector, China still has one
of the least developed telecommunications systems in Asia. With a telephone penetration
rate of only 1.46 percent countrywide (1994), compared with more than 50 access lines per
100 people in the United States, and with figures as low as 0.2 lines per 100 people in
some provinces, China clearly has a lot of development work ahead. In fact, China has set
a target of installing another 50 million phone lines by the year 2000.("Telecoms", EIU,
March 1994) Like other developing countries, however, it is beset by a lack of capital to
finance much of its projected development.
Aside from the financial issues, there is also the question of how developing countries
such as China should go about restructuring this sector. Is deregulation and competition
the best way for these countries to upgrade their telecommunications infrastructures, or
should they rely on a monopolistic national telecommunication authority as South Korea,
Singapore, and Japan did? Furthermore, should they follow the traditional path of laying
down copper phone wires, or should they use wireless networks in lieu of wireline? These
questions are common to all of Asia's low income countries including Vietnam, Sri Lanka,
Indonesia, Pakistan, and China.
9
However, China's unique political and economic situation make the telecommunications
policy arena very different from that of many other developing countries. China's economy
continues to grow at double-digit rates, after being the world's fastest growing economy
in the late 80's, yet it is also in transition from being a socialist to a market economy.
Moreover, the state retains its political authoritarianism; decisions are not made in the
open, and the structure and policy-making process behind telecommunications are not fully
understood.
This thesis seeks to elucidate the telecommunications sector organization and policy
making process, and then to examine the effects that recent technological and investment
trends will have on China's ability to meet its growing telecommunications demand. In
particular, I will study the opening up of the market to foreign investment as a policy tool,
and the use of several wireless communications systems as technological innovations neces-
sary for China to meet both its growing urban and rural needs. Through these examples I
will also show that increased decentralization in China's telecommunications authority has
devolved a great deal of control from the central government and made the concept of a
single coherent "telecommunications policy" problematic at best.
1.2 Structure and Focus of the Thesis
Foreign study of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) telecommunications sector is rela-
tively new. The World Bank completed its first study of the sector in 1992, and the largest
body of research is probably in market studies done by various companies and consulting
firms. In these types of analyses, the emphasis is on the identification of investment op-
portunities, the understanding of policy directives as affects these opportunities, and the
prediction of future investment trends.
This study will focus instead on an understanding of the players and interests driving
development of the sector, as well as the way in which not only official pronouncements by
the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, but also global trends towards liberalization
and the adoption of specific types of technologies shape the ability of the sector to meet
growing demand.
Chapter two starts with an overview of the larger Chinese picture, including key points of
economic and enterprise reform, as well as a review of Oksenberg and Lieberthal's model for
10
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understanding policy-making in China. It also provides some background on global trends
in telecommunications reform, and addresses the need for telecommunications policies and
laws, both in general and particularly in China.
Chapter three moves on with a presentation of the current state of telecommunications
development and access to network services in China. I then summarize sector organization
and analyze recent developments such as the formation of Lian Tong and Ji Tong.
In Chapter four I study the prospects for foreign investments in Chinese telecoms, ex-
amining both the need for such investment, attitudes towards foreign involvement, and
how the outcome of the current debate is likely to shape the future of the sector and vice
versa. The linkages between decentralization and foreign investment are also addressed.
This chapter also discusses the "policy of exceptions" as a framework for understanding the
telecommunications sector. Then I draw on the experiences of several other countries in the
Asia-Pacific region to understand China's options.
Chapter five uses the concept of the "policy of exceptions" to investigate some of the
key exceptions to MPT regulations - wireless technologies. This chapter will go into some
details about the different technological choices facing China in the mobile front, in order
to illustrate the interactions between policy and technology adoption, and to evaluate the
effects that different wireless systems may have in satisfying demand in different areas of
the country. In particular, the idea of "technological leapfrogging" is discussed as a creative
solution to China's growing demand problem.
Chapter six ties together the policy and technology choices faced by the sector with an
analysis of the major problems to be addressed in the Chinese telecom sector right now. I
then make some recommendations regarding foreign investment and technology adoption
usage; summarize, and conclude with suggestions for future study.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Telecommunications and Economic Development
A strong positive correlation between general economic development as measured by GNP
per capita or other similar aggregate statistics, and development of telecommunications
infrastructure is well established. While this sort of evidence provides only general and
descriptive insights into the benefits of telecommunications, it is quite useful in achieving
a general understanding of trends. Most of the empirical work done is either statistical
correlation or regression analysis at a country level; or structural economic analysis which
uses input-output analysis to focus on levels of activity in different sectors. For example,
Figures 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3 show the density of telephone lines graphed against GDP per capita
for low, medium, and high teledensity countries. (Zita, PECC, 1995. Original source: ITU)
Studies using proxies for GDP and telephone density have also had similar results. For
example a study by Bebee and Gilling in 1976 graphs a telephone index against a develop-
ment support index for 29 countries. See Figure 2-4. The "development support index" is
developed based on measures such as the proportion of GDP used in fixed capital forma,
tion, the literacy rate of the population over fifteen years of age, median number of years of
education in the population, per capita daily intake of protein and calories, percentage of
population living in urban areas, and the population growth rate. The "telephone index"
was constructed from the number of telephones per 100 literate people over age 15 in the
population, number of business telephones per 100 nonagricultural person, and the average
annual number of telephones per telephone. The results are similar to those found in simple
GDP vs. teledensity graphs, but suggest that in higher-income and developed countries,
12
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telephone availability and use increases faster than other such support factors. (Saunders,
Warford, Wellenius, 1994)
More recently, methodology developed by Andrew Hardy has shown that the causality
runs in both directions - economic development leads to more investment in telecommuni-
cations, but telecommunications also contributes to economic development.(Hudson, 1990)
Why is this so? Access to a means of communication can facilitate the development process
by improving efficiency, or ratio of output to cost; effectiveness, or quality of products or
services; and equity throughout a society. Unfortunately, if development occurs only among
the areas already richer or more developed, then telecommunications can also have the effect
of widening the gap between "haves" and "have-nots" rather than bringing more equity.
The benefits of telecommunications can be both direct and indirect. As a result, benefits
are usually greater than those measured solely from the anticipated revenue of a network.
For example, benefits may accrue to both the caller and the person called and there may
be additional savings from reduction in travel costs and energy usage. Telecommunica-
tions are often more efficient than postal services and travel, and there is some evidence
that increased access to reliable phone service can allow markets to work more effectively
(Saunders, Warford, and Wellenius, 1994). In fact, several studies by the ITU, OECD,
World Bank and other development agencies have shown that the benefit - cost ratio of
telecommunications usage ranges from 5:1 to more than 100:1, especially in rural areas.
14
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Furthermore, investment in the telecommunications sector generally yields high rates of
economic return. For example, thirteen telecommunications projects approved for World
Bank support yield rates of return ranging from 15 to 30 percent as compared to 10-14
percent, which is used by the Bank as a threshold for acceptable investments in developing
countries. (Saunders, Warford, and Wellenius, 1994) Despite these potential benefits, the
supply of telecommunications services in developing countries continues to be far below
demand. Telephone density in developing countries varies widely from 0.1 lines per 100
people in countries such as Madagascar to 10 lines per 100 in Argentina and Uruguay.
(Saunders, Warford, and Wellenius, 1994.) The problem has been both a lack of money
and the fact that, until recently, telecommunications was not treated as basic infrastructure
such as power grids and roads, and thus was ignored by planners.
This is especially true of Asia. With 3 billion people having access to few more than
30 million phone lines, there is an awareness that the region as a whole needs to undergo a
crash program of unprecedented expansion. Reliable and up-to-date communications are as
important as ports, roads and railways once were; they are necessary for attracting foreign
investment and national growth. Asia is particularly well suited to rapid telecommunications
development to go along with its economic expansion because of the relatively low density
of existing telephone. This lack of infrastructure may aqtually make new technology easier
to integrate.
In the Chinese case, a rapidly expanding economy acts as both cause and effect of swift
telecommunications modernization; as communication becomes easier, there is more incen-
tive for businesses to invest, and as more money comes into the economy, more can be spent
on telecommunications. In fact, from 1985-1992 the growth rate of telecommunications has
exceeded both that of GNP and trade. (See Table 2-1) In 1991 and 1992 the growth rate of
the telecommunications sector exceeded 40%, and it reached 71.6% in the first four months
of 1993. In fact, it is believed that the growth rate of the telecommunications industry needs
to be higher than that of the economy as a whole because its "social benefit..is much higher
than the direct benefit received by the posts and telecommunications authority itself"'.
According to one Chinese study of the relationship between investment in posts and tele-
com and the national economy as a whole, an additional investment of 100 million yuan in
the telecom sector would increase national income by 1.38 billion yuan in 10 years, ie. an
16
1Zhao and Junjia, April 1994
implicit internal rate of return of 45% (Zhao and Junjia, April 1994.)
2.1.1 Spatial Effects of Telecom Development
The "information gap" does not exist only between industrialized and developing countries,
but also within countries themselves. For example, in 1988 the number of urban telephone
subscribers in China was more than three times the number of rural users, although more
than half of the population lived in rural areas. Money going into China's telecom expan-
sion is going mostly to the more developed, coastal areas. The dualistic nature of telecom
development is only one example of the dualism within the country as a whole. According to
Singer, the concept of dualism has four main elements: 1) A different set of "superior" and
"inferior" conditions which can coexist in a given time and space; 2) a chronic rather than
temporary nature; 3) the degree of disparity has a tendency to increase; 4) the relations
between "superior" and "inferior" elements are such that the better does not pull up the
worse, and may in fact serve to push it down. (Lee, 1991.) On the basis of these characteris-
tics, Lee identifies three levels of dualism in Chinese telecom: rural-urban, core-peripheral,
and advanced-rudimentary.
Time-series data indicates that the rural-urban gap in communications in China is indeed
"chronic," and has widened over time. In 1965 the rural-urban telephone density ratio was
1:1.6, but it had grown to 1:3.3 by 1988. Similarly, provinces such as Guangdong have
long dominated the telecommunications system, and there is some evidence that these
regions hurt less developed regions by their ability to attract a limited total amount of
investment. In 1988, Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangdong alone received nearly 60% of total
capital investment in telecommunications. Because the coastal cities attract investment,
people and resources of the remote and north-west regions are more and more drawn to the
coast. Lee characterizes this phenomenon as "an exploitative core-peripheral relationship
as described by dependence theories." (Lee, 1991.)
Unplanned large scale migration from rural to urban areas is perhaps the greatest con-
cern about the widening technology gaps. Large influxes of unemployed rural laborers have
created living and health problems in Guangdong in recent years, slowing down urban de-
velopment as pressure is put on resources for energy, water, transportation, housing, etc
in the city. On the other hand, the communication dualism is only one of many factors
leading to migration and in fact, some have argued that a rural telephone program, far from
17
keeping people happy in their rural locations, would make it easier for people to keep in
touch with their home village and family and thus make migrating to cities more attractive.
(Saunders, Warford, and Wellenius, 1994.)
Lee also examines the "advanced-rudimentary" dualism in communications, or the co-
existence of basic and modern technologies. This is another way of stating China's unique
ability to "leapfrog" over many years of telecom development. According to Lee, the si-
multaneous uses of loudspeakers to transmit radio messages in some villages, and high-tech
digital cellular systems in other areas of the country is complementary: "the modern and
traditional sectors do not constrain each other's development.." (Lee, 1991.) Thus the
presence of a dualism here is not necessarily negative. If China can take advantage of the
opportunity to leap-frog, rather than forcing each area of the country to go through the
same technological progression, then it can succeed in bringing its telecom infrastructure
"into the 21st century without ever seeing the 20th."
The difficulty, though, will be in providing rural remote areas with communications.
Thus far the Chinese government has provided little incentive to do so despite evidence
that the availability of telecommunications can contribute significantly to rural economic
activities, and that the benefits of investment may be the greatest in rural and remote areas
where distances are greater and telephone penetration lower. (Hudson, 1990.)
Whether rural or urban, the linkages between development of the telecommunications
industry and economic development as a whole are quite strong. Furthermore, a broader
view of macroeconomic policy, especially policies on investment and enterprise development,
helps us understand the options open to a country trying to develop its infrastructure.
2.2 Economic Reform in China
2.2.1 The Backdrop for Change
During the post 1949 period, but before economic reform, China modeled its economy after
the Soviet-style centrally planned system. The state owned most industries and exerted
central control over economic planning and the financial system. However, the extent to
which the economy was centrally planned was never quite as much as in the former Soviet
Union. In 1960 there were only about 500 commodities under mandatory planning as
compared to 20,000 in the former Soviet Union. (Harrold, 1992.) In practice, most economic
18
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activity was quite decentralized, with local officials capable of implementing, formulating,
and planning local economic activity. In addition to providing experience with local control
- a characteristic which persists - this regional autonomy also created severe inefficiencies
because there was so little flow of goods and services between areas. For example, about
seventy-five percent of the grain grown in China was consumed by the families that produced
it. (Army Handbook, 1994.) Thus, there was much to be gained from interprovincial trade
which could exploit the comparative advantage of different locales.
Within a single city, enterprises ranged from small, collectively owned handicraft units,
barely earning subsistence-level incomes for their members, to state-owned factories whose
workers received steady wages as well as social benefits. (Army Handbook, 1994.) However,
the disparities from region to region are even greater. The large land area of China and the
extremely diverse climatic and geographical regions combined with the regional autonomy
resulted in various areas of the country having very different levels of technological sophisti-
cation, prosperity, and economic activity. The contrast between rural and urban areas was
particularly stark, but also developed along the core-periphery axis, with regions such as
Beijing becoming wealthier while provinces such as Qinghai and Xinjiang lagged behind.
Also during the post 1949 period, China was transformed from an almost exclusively
rural, peasant economy to one in which industry had a 49 percent share in the economy
by 1978. By 1991, agriculture accounted for only 26% of GNP, with industry making up
most of the rest. Of the share in 1978, 78 percent came from large and medium sized
state-owned enterprises, with a much smaller share from local enterprises. These large state
enterprises were bureaucratic and overburdened with almost every type of social obligation
for workforces which were too large. (Harrold, 1992.) Thus, prior to 1978 there were
many socioeconomic pressures pushing towards reform. Furthermore, unlike other socialist
economies in transition, China experienced no deep macroeconomic crisis. Reform was
gradual and was not accompanied by the usual strong deflationary policies.
2.2.2 The Socialist Market Economy
Since 1978, China's economic system has evolved from centralized state planning to a struc-
ture with some market allocation and commercial competition known as "a new system of
planned commodity economy of Chinese style." Debates over the relationship between plan-
ning and the market were a key feature of China's economic landscape until the Constitution
19
was amended in March 1993 when "planned economy under public ownership" was changed
to "socialist market economy." Although there is some disagreement about what a socialist
market economy is, it is generally agreed that such an economy allows market forces to play
a key role in resource allocation while still maintaining "public ownership" (state or collec-
tive ownership) and adopting measures to prevent "unfair" income distributions.(Harrold
and Lall, 1993.)
These principles are applied by the State Planning Commission, which retains respon-
sibility for planning at the national level. It also articulates five-year economic plans which
establish general goals and priorities for capital investment, production, and supply; annual
plans which include performance targets for state owned and commercial enterprises; and
allocates funding for each year. Part of current reform plan is to shift the implementation
of these goals from direct administrative controls to indirect economic tools such as prices,
taxes, and interest rates.
The opening up to the outside world encompassed changes in six key areas, namely: 1)
enterprise reform 2) financial sector issues, 3) fiscal reform, 4) external reforms, 5) price
reform, and 6) social sector reform. (Harrold, 1992) Of greatest importance to the telecom-
munications sector development were the reforms in enterprises and foreign investment.
2.2.3 Enterprise Reform
Poor performance of many state-owned industries and subsidies to state-owned enterprises
has produced a large fiscal burden on the government. To help recoop these losses, reform
has tried to make state-owned enterprises independent economic entities, responsible for
their own losses and profits. In essence, China's approach to enterprise reform can be
characterized as marketization or corporatization rather than privatization of state-owned
enterprises. The two most significant changes came in 1984 when targets were lowered and
enterprises were allowed to sell above plan output on markets; and when profit remittances
to the central government were changed to a system whereby enterprises paid income taxes
and shared profits with their local authorities (Harrold, 1992.) Shifting the aim of state-
owned enterprises gradually from meeting output targets to meeting financial targets has
reduced many efficiency losses in the economy.
Separation of "dual rights" - protection of the management autonomy of a state owned
enterprise while the state retains final ownership - is key to China's strategy of enterprise
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reform. Under the widespread contract responsibility system (CRS), a state-owned enter-
prise manager is supervised by the relevant line bureau according to a set of performance
indicators; unfortunately this system has diluted management autonomy quite a bit. This
issue was addressed in July 1992 with the State Council's publication of The Regulations for
Transforming the Operating Mechanisms of the State- Owned Enterprises which called for
the protection through law of the autonomous rights of state-owned enterprises in fourteen
key areas. By March 1993, 28 out of 30 provinces and autonomous regions had published
their regulations for implementing and enforcing these rights. However, bureaucratic inter-
ference still remains an issue for most enterprises, especially in investment, import/export,
personnel, and excess levies and taxation by supervisors (Harrold and Lall, 1993).
In addition to enterprise autonomy, another major aspect of the "dual rights" approach is
the formation of shareholding companies. A shareholding company is taxed at the standard
33 percent tax rate and must operate under normal tax rules rather than the contract-
based tax arrangements typical of CRS. In addition, the manager is responsible to a board
of directors rather than government officials, which greatly reduces the scope for government
intervention. In 1992, shareholding companies were given a major boost when the System
Reform Commission enhanced their legal status with the publication of "Views of Standards
for Limited Share Companies" and when 400 additional enterprises were transformed into
limited liability and shareholding companies. By the end of 1992, there were a total of
3,700 shareholding companies, but 86 percent of these had issued shares only to staff and
workers. While these shareholding companies have done well, they have been limited mostly
to state-owned enterprises which already had good performance. Further experimentation
and development of a nationwide legal and regulatory framework will be necessary if they
are to make a greater impact.
2.2.4 Foreign Investment
The passing of the joint venture law in 1979 and the opening of the first four Special Eco-
nomic Zones in 1980 marked the beginnings of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China.
Although FDI was an important component of Deng Xiaoping's reform process from the
start, up until 1986 it was focused exclusively on export-oriented industries. The "22 Arti-
cles" of 1986 removed the most serious constraint, China's attempt to force joint ventures
to use foreign exchange to achieve self-sufficiency. Further improvements came in 1990 with
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the introduction of regulations limiting the scope of administrative intervention in joint
venture operations. By the early 1990s China was the largest recipient of foreign direct
investment in the developing world. ("The Economy", EIU, February 1, 1995)
According to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC),
the total volume of contracted foreign investment between 1979 and 1993 was $221.9 billion
across 174,228 projects, of which 81% were committed to the coastal regions and 33.7% to
Guangdong alone. Almost 70% of total foreign investment originates from Hong Kong, with
Taiwan next at 8.3% (though much of this is routed through Hong Kong), and then the
USA with 6.5% of the total. Japan followed, with just 4%. Whereas many investments from
Hong Kong and Japan are in labor-intensive processing and assembly operations, Western
operations tend to favor more value-added technology.
Gradual liberalization of the foreign trade regime, including reductions in the numbers of
commodities subject to import and export quotas or licenses, as well as other reforms have
made China a major force in the world market. Nevertheless, there are still many restrictions
particularly on imports, and China is under pressure to undertake further reform if it wants
to join the World Trade Organization.
Currently the three primary types of enterprises with foreign investments in China are
equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned ventures. Equity
joint ventures are limited liability companies in which the foreign partner must contribute
at least 25 percent of the capital and cannot recover its investment until liquidation or sale
of the venture. There is no limitation on the number of partners in the venture, and profits
are distributed according to capital contribution.
Under the law governing contractual joint ventures, or cooperative joint ventures, the
parties determine the form of operation through negotiation of a contract. Usually they
will form a new limited liability company or operate jointly as partners. There are no
government stipulations on the duration of the venture, the amount of capital the foreign
investor contributes, or on profit distribution.
The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) is responsible for
approving all three kinds of ventures. Equity joint ventures are usually decided upon in
ninety days and contractual joint ventures in forty-five. Wholly foreign-owned ventures are
usually only approved if MOFERT believes that the enterprise will benefit the development
of China's national economy. Therefore, enterprises using advanced technology and equip-
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ment, or those which manufacture products not made in China are favored.(National Trade
Data Bank, March 11, 1992)
2.3 Policy Making in China
The policy making process in China is often obscured and incomprehensible to outsiders.
Prior to the 1970s, Chinese decision-making was usually portrayed in very static terms,
emphasizing the totalitarian nature of the central government, the absence of the rule of
law, and the allegedly firm grasp that the state had on all of society. (Lieberthal and
Oksenberg, 1988.) However, this approach proved unable to explain the dynamics of the
Cultural Revolution and changes that occurred after that. As a result, several new models
were advanced. I will examine these models of decision making in China, and adopt one to
apply to the case of the telecommunications sector.
2.3.1 Rationality Model
The basic premise of the rationality model is that "policy outcomes are the result of an
evaluation of choices by a coherent group with shared perceptions of the values to be max-
imized in response to a perceived problem. The overarching concern of the group is to
advance the national interest." (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988.) Though few policy ana-
lysts would apply this in its pure form, the more subtle implications are that Chinese policy
outcomes are guided by debate and dialogue over policy issues or problems. Contingent
upon this interpretation, however, is the availability of relevant information to decision
makers, clearly articulated and known priorities, and sufficient time for policy makers to
consciously evaluate their options. Often, these components are missing or superseded by
other considerations.
2.3.2 Power Model
Struggles for power among individuals and factions form the basis for the second major
model of Chinese policy and politics. According to this analysis, substantive issues are not
the key determinant of policy debates and outcomes, but rather "policy is the aggregate
response of leaders or factions to problems they perceive, and this response reflects the
relative power of the participants, their strategies for advancing their beliefs and political
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interests, and their differentiated understanding of the problem at hand." (Lieberthal and
Oksenberg, 1988.)
Lucian Pye employs this sort of framework in The Dynamics of Chinese Politics while
emphasizing the importance of Chinese culture: the importance of personal relations (guan
xi), the deep-seated fear of disorder (luan), the long history and appeal of patron-client ties
which works against large scale organization, and the fact that conflict is not handled well.
The need for order and conformity, when placed against the need for personal relations,
tends to produce factions that form and break easily. Thus in this approach strategies,
motivations, the costs of conflict and cooperation are central to understanding what policies
are produced and implemented.
2.3.3 Bureaucratic Structure
Lieberthal and Oksenberg reexamine these two models of the Chinese policy-making process
to develop a new approach that incorporates elements of both the "power" and "policy"
aspects while emphasizing the bureaucratic struggles and structure which inform policy de-
cisions. This framework addresses the pervasiveness of the bureaucracy, for example, in the
incorporation of directives into the budget, and the jurisdiction of implementing directives.
"The neglect of the bureaucratic structure frequently leads to dubious assumptions about
the policy process..both the policy and power analysts search for logical coherence in policy
and assume it to have an underlying, logical consistence. Or, they attribute..discrepancies..
to differences among the elite."(Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988.) This thesis will adopt
Lieberthal and Oksenberg's model to understanding the "protracted, disjointed, and in-
cremental" policy process in which not only policy and power, but also the fragmented
bureaucratic structure are key variables in determining outcome.
In particular, Lieberthal and Oksenberg stress the fragmented structure of authority
within the leadership, the role of consensus building in the policy process, the diffuse nature
of this process, and the locus of decision making. This decision making starts with the four
tiers of the central government: 1) a core group of about thirty elite leaders who propose
policy 2) their staff, leaderships groups and institutes which serves to buffer them from the
bureaucracy, 3) commissions and ministries with supra-ministerial status and coordinate
activities of line ministries and provinces, and 4) ordinary ministries which implement policy
in their particular area.(Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988)
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As with other areas of government, the telecommunications sector can be understood
through an analysis of competing bureaucracies, the lack of a single coherent leader or
decision maker, and core leaders who favor different parts of the bureaucracy.
2.4 Trends in Telecommunications Reform
The divestiture of AT&T in 1984, the establishment of a facilities-based duopoly in 1981
followed by privatization of British Telecom and Cable & Wireless in 1984, and the intro-
duction of competition and privatization of NTT in Japan in 1985 marked the beginning of
a wave of telecommunications sector reform that has reached around the world in less than
a decade. By 1993, major reforms were under way in at least fifteen developing countries,
though the extent of reform varies greatly from place to place.
Although each country is unique, the overall result of reform in industrialized countries
seems to have been quite positive. Stakeholders have come out ahead, employees have
better salaries, and consumers have increased choice. However, the developing countries face
unique obstacles and concerns which may require their approach to be different from that of
the industrialized nations. Unlike state communication monopolies in the developed world,
those in developing countries generally fell short of meeting service requirements. In fact,
large unmet demand for connections, call traffic congestion, poor quality and reliability of
service, limited territorial coverage, and a user willingness to pay more are all characteristics
of telecommunications systems in most developing countries.
Because of these existing problems, large efficiency gains come very easily from improved
management, technical innovation, and a separation of the monopolistic operator from
the government. However, reform in developing countries also faces unique difficulties:
an incomplete telecommunications infrastructure sometimes lacking even the most basic
services; scarce human resources to run telecommunications as a commercial operation;
limited information; undeveloped local capital markets which make privatization difficult;
weak legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks; and limited access to foreign investors
and banks.(Wellenius and Stern, 1994.)
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2.4.1 Competition
One of the themes of telecommunications reform has been the introduction of competition.
However, competition itself can have different meanings according to context. Economically,
it implies a situation in which all firms are price takers, though in the business sense it is
the presence of some rivalry among firms though some may have more pricing power than
others. Because telecommunications has traditionally been a monopoly, pure competition
is not something that can be reached at once, if ever. Furthermore, there are two basic
ways of introducing competition into a telecommunications market: to accept new entrants
without any explicit restrictions, or to admit competitors in limited numbers.
Canada and Australia have adopted this second approach, controlling the rate of entry
and restricting the number of newcomers. In the US, long distance markets are free to
competition whereas local services are provided by regulated companies that in effect act
as monopolists. In Japan, competition has been introduced into both the local and long-
distance market with the division into Type I and Type II carriers. Type I carriers are
businesses which own telecommunications facilities and require authorization of the MPT;
Type II does not. Meanwhile Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT) still
provides both local and long-distance services. Finally, South Korea has adopted a unique
approach by announcing plans for a nationwide flat-rate pricing. (See Chapter 4).
There are several reasons for the different approaches to competition adopted by the US
and Japan on one side and Australia and Canada on the other. First, the business demands
in the US and Japan are larger, the market is larger, and allows more competition. This is
true because the demands for telecom services allow firms to enter the market with bullish
expectations, diminishing the significance of sunk cost as firms are confident about the
ability to sell off their facilities in the future should they need to. Secondly, the US and
Japan have had a longer period in which technology of telecommunications and computers
have merged, which has given their electronics equipment industry a boost. This in turn
feeds the telecom industry. Furthermore in Japan and the US, large business customers are
willing to bypass traditional carriers when the prices are competitive. China is similar in
this respect with its many specialized networks. (Nambu, 1994)
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2.4.2 The World Bank
China has been influenced by these trends towards competition, especially by the World
Bank. In a review of Smith and Staples' World Bank Discussion Paper Telecommuni-
cations Sector Reform in Asia: Toward a New Pragmatism, Jonathan Solomon is some-
what critical of this focus, calling the paper "almost like a vindication for the major Rea-
gan/Thatcher/Nakasone thrust during the 1980s. Its recommendation to manage infrastruc-
ture like a business, and not a bureaucracy, to introduce competition wherever feasible..are
all in accord with their policies...The monolithic public utility monopolist and the pluralist
multiple private vendors of multiple services are two very different models. With the World
Bank going decisively one way, where does this leave the ITU..?" (Solomon, 1994) While
China has received aid and loans from the World Bank recently for telecommunications
infrastructure, it is far from achieving, or striving for, complete deregulation.
2.5 Telecommunications Law
Legislation and regulation are vital to an effective telecommunications systems. Without
them, market and regulatory confusion prevails.
China is one of the few countries that does not have a telecommunications law governing
its industry. This is not surprising given China's history as a country without clearly
legalized property rights or property ownership. Unlike countries of the West as well as
newly industrialized and authoritarian countries such as Singapore, China does not have a
tradition of following a "rule of law" as we understand it. However, the lack of a telecom
law is now probably the most serious obstacle to hindering efficient growth of the industry.
Lack of clear guidelines results in market uncertainty and confusion around the issue of
interconnection.
As a result, the National People's Congress (NPC) entrusted the MPT with preparation
of a draft of a telecommunications law. This was submitted by the MPT in 1994 to the
State Council's Bureau of Legal Affairs for review and consultation. The draft was then
due to be discussed and passed by the National People's Congress in 1995, but has now
been delayed, probably for another two or three years.
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2.6 The Need for Regulation
In parallel with these legal reforms, China is trying to introduce effective regulation to im-
prove sector performance. To this end, the National People's Congress passed an Anti-unfair
Competition Act effective December 1, 1993, as well as a set of regulations in September
1993 to liberalize MPT approved, value-added services such as radio paging, 800 MHz
trunked mobile service, 450 MHz radio mobile services, domestic VSAT, and other such
services under licensing systems.(Xu, 1994)
In general, there are two kinds of regulation: operational and administrative. Oper-
ational regulation refers to regulation in which the agency or mechanism that oversees
telecommunications policies and prices is an agency of the state, often part of the Ministry
of Communications or some similar organ. This group is supposed to represent the interests
of both the system users and equipment suppliers. However, because operational regulators
are tied to the operation and management of the telecommunications administration, the
various interests often become confused.
On the other hand, administrative regulation uses a separate regulator and a separate
operating entity. There is a clear distinction between those who make the rules and those
who manage the communications system. This prevents policies from being formed because
of the special needs of some supplier, and allows an independent assessment of both man-
agerial and social requirements in policy formation. This model, which has been adopted
by countries such as the US, is strongly encouraged by the World Bank for developing
countries. With the split of the MPT, China is also moving in this direction.
2.6.1 Regulatory Goals
Public regulation usually has several goals: maximizing economic efficiency, protecting cus-
tomers, promoting various social goals, and standardizing technical operations. When the
sector is dominated by a monopoly, there is the danger that the monopolist will price higher
and produce less than would a competitive market. In such cases, the regulator can act to
promote efficiency in production, technology, and the' use of new services. In other cases,
the regulator has acted to prevent anti-competitive behavior and oversee the transition from
monopoly to competitive market.
Protection of customers should be a primary goal of regulation. Marginal consumers
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are in the greatest danger of losing access to fair and reasonable telecommunications ser-
vice. Furthermore, the government may wish to subsidize service to the poor as part of
a government program; it is the job of the regulator to help achieve these goals. Finally,
regardless of the degree of centralization, all telephone systems need standard interfaces so
that different parts of the network can be used together. This is especially important and
difficult in a large country such as China, which uses so many different types of equipment.
2.6.2 Regulatory Functions
The three main regulatory functions are price regulation, technical regulation, and sector
structure. According to the World Bank, the primary goals of price regulation are to prevent
monopoly abuses, to prevent service cross-subsidies which disadvantage new competition;
to prevent cross- subsidies which promote inefficiencies; and to avoid situations in which one
group is unfairly favored at the expense of others. (Wellenius, WB Report No. 9413-CHA)
Price regulation is determined either with rate of returns or price caps.
Under rate of return regulation, the operator's prices are set so that it will recover costs
as well as provide a rate of return equal to the social cost of capital. Many economists
dislike this approach because it guarantees a certain rate of return and thus gives the
supplier incentive to keep prices high. On the other hand, price cap regulation starts with
determination of the supplier's rate of return. Then a cap is put on the firm's overall
prices for a certain period of time. This cap is usually set such that the firm is forced to
achieve at least minimum productivity gains over a certain period of time. This method is
also preferred because of its simplicity compared to the rate of return method, but it has
already run into controversies in the US when dominant firms having monopoly power have
abused their price structures.
Another aspect of price regulation which emerges after competition has been introduced
is the need for rate rebalancing. Historically, cross subsidization has existed among services
because of reasons including external economies associated with communications, income
redistribution, economies of scale, and economies of scope (including vertical integration)
(Nambu, 1994). As a result, there has traditionally been a large discrepancy between
rates and costs, especially between long distance and local service. Once competition is
introduced, the margin between rates and costs is reduced and demand for services often
increases.
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Technical regulation is generally comprised of regulating the use of the radio frequency
spectrum, assuring interoperability of all components of the public network, and assuring
a minimum level of technical quality and availability to the customers. While the ITU
establishes general rules about radio spectrum allocation, it is up to each country to deter-
mine who will have access to the spectrum. Furthermore, the regulator should have some
mechanism with which to settle interference problems that may arise as more people are
given access to the spectrum.
In the US the question of interoperability is handled through the setting of minimum
standards for network connections. For example, standards for equipment interfaces, sig-
nally requirements, and software protocols are used. It is the obligation of providers of
network service such as the MPT to make sure that components connected to the public
network meet national standards. In the US these standards are set largely by private in-
dustry working with advisory committees under the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC).
The third key need for regulation is the need for technical quality control. Without
regulatory controls, service standards may be low, especially in situations where there is
a lot of unmet demand and pressure to expand service. However, high quality network
operation is necessary to maintain efficiency; poor operation results in higher switching and
transmission costs as well. Regulation of technical quality should also include some means
of adjucating service quality. In the US, state regulatory commissions periodically review
service quality based on both customer complaints and independent regulatory review.
2.6.3 Regulations in other Countries
United States
US communications law reflects the country's legal tradition based heavily on formal laws
and administrative processes. Its basis is the Communications Act of 1934, which requires
that communications be regulated according to its public good, convenience, and necessity.
Not only are operations and regulations completely separate, but federal laws are assured
supremacy over state laws, preventing some of the problems that have arisen from the
decentralization of China's network.
The FCC is responsible for technical standards, spectrum use, system accounting, pricing
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standards and levels, etc. Although the break-up of AT&T and the wave of deregulation
of the 1980s significantly reduced FCC's role in pricing and service, it retains some say in
the prices that AT&T, still the dominant carrier, can charge, as well as how each of its
competitors will have access to long distance and local networks.
The growth of the national network and the need for interoperability has effectively
transferred much of the power from the states to the FCC. However each state does have
a regulatory commission which controls intrastate long distance and local exchange service
and rates.
After deregulation, rate rebalancing occurred very quickly in the US. Long distance
rates fell, local rates increased, and an "FCC subscriber line charge" for the local telephone
company was added to the cost of each access line as way to make the contribution that long
distance service gives to local networks more explicit. (Nambu, 1994). Federal regulators
justified this charge by the argument that long distance callers have historically paid per-
minute charges for use of the local loop while local callers pay nothing. Thus while the
marginal cost of using the local network is very small, the fixed costs of having the network
are still quite large and the charge is designed to address this fact.
United Kingdom
The Chinese government reportedly studied both the American and German models of
telecommunications structuring, but rejected them because they it did not wish to split up
its network on a federal basis. Instead, it is now looking into the model adopted by UK and
Australia, in which a state monopoly has been replaced by a controlled duopoly in which a
second smaller player has functions outside the previous monopoly network and receives a
certain amount of revenue up front. ("China: Breaking Up," May 1994)
More specifically, the Telecommunications Act of 1984 provided British Telecom (BT)
with a license to provide public telecommunications services. BT is controlled by the De-
partment of Trade and Industry (DTI), and regulated by the Office of Telecommunications
(Oftel) within DTI. Oftel also regulates Mercury, the private company authorized to com-
pete with BT. Mercury is not subject to the same level of regulation as BT because it
is not viewed as a dominant company. Recently, Oftel and DTI reviewed the status of
the "BT/Mercury duopoly" and recommended an increase in competition in the sector.
(Wellenius, WB Report No. 9413-CHA)
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While the comparisons with MPT/Lian Tong are obvious, we should remember that
unlike Mercury, Lian Tong has yet to become a coherent entity or corporation, and that it
is comprised of other branches of the government.
Japan
Japan's telecommunications sector has undergone dramatic changes as competition has been
introduced. There are two kinds of carriers: type I and type II both of which are open to
competition. Type I carriers, of which there are about 70, can offer basic and enhanced
services to the public. Their tariffs are subject to formal approval by the MPT, and they
are expected to receive fair returns, in the spirit of the FCCs rate of return regulation.
Type II carriers are subject to minimal regulation and more competition. General type II
carriers are supposed to provide services to a limited size community, while type II carriers
which provide special services are unrestricted. (Wellenius, WB Report No. 9413-CHA)
Unlike the US and UK, Japan has had only minimal price rebalancing since deregulation.
Changing local rates has met strong political resistance because the benefits of rebalancing
are not seen as equally distributed. Moreover, the MPT intends to protect new entrants
into the market by protecting them from price competition. (Nambu, 1994).
2.7 Chinese Regulatory Structure
2.7.1 Pricing Policy
In the PRC, initial telephone charges are quite high compared to the incremental cost of
connecting a subscriber to the network. This serves both to finance investments and to
ration scarce connections, since many people cannot afford the high prices. In US dollars,
initial fees included $17 to be on the waiting list, and $80 - $320 for the connection in
cities, and $150-$650 for provincial capitals. (Wellenius, WB Report No. 9413-CHA)
Local telephone charges are very low compared with international standards. National
long distance rates are also lower than in other countries, but international rates are about
double those of developed countries, and these themselves are very high compared with cost.
An initial study by the World Bank in 1988 recommended that local telephone charges be
increased an average of 60% and long distance charges decreased by 25 %. See Tables 2.2
and 2.3 for current charges.
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These tariffs are set on a countrywide basis by the central MPT subject to approval by
the State Price Board (SPB). The prices are supposed to assure that the cost of produc-
tion is covered, but this is difficult because the government still sets the prices for most
commodities. Therefore, these prices ultimately reflect the government's choice rather than
economic costs. The MPT has been overall modestly profitable, with an annual rate of
return of about 7% in 1988. (Wellenius, WB Report No. 9413-CHA) However, there are
very large cross-subsidies in the system both between local and long distance calling and
between regions of the country. For instance, in 1989 the ROR ranged from 28% in Beijing
to -22% in Tibet. According to the World Bank, the overall tariff rate for the main network
in 1989 was about right - the 12% ROR was an accurate reflection of the social cost of
capital. However, they estimated that tariffs in Guangdong, Shanghai and Tianjin should
have been about 20% lower to make their profits equal to double the actual level in other
areas of the country (ie Guizhou, Gansu, Ningxia). (Wellenius, WB Report No. 9413-CHA)
2.7.2 Technical Regulation
The MPT has established a system to set and monitor compliance with technical standards
for equipment in the public network. Currently, the DST sets standards while the DOC
tests samples of equipment such as telephone sets, Fax machines, and modems, and issues
manufacturing licenses. The national network standards that do exist, for example, for
numbering, signalling, and transmission, are also set by the DST and enforced by the DGT.
(Wellenius, WB Report No. 9413-CHA)
Channel allocation for mobile communications is one example of the MPT's technical
regulation (see chapter 4). Another technical standard that needs to be revised is the
numbering plan for mobile communications. The current specifications for TACS (total
area coverage system) require a Mobile Identification Number (MIN) for each subscriber.
However, the current arrangement is such that there cannot be more than 10 thousand
subscribers in an area. Several solutions have been proposed within the MPT. (Zhang
Nong, 1994)
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Table 2.1: Growth Rates in GNP, Trade, and Telecommunications
Note: Units are in 100 million yuan. Percentages are changes from the previous year. Trade
is defined as import value + export value.(Zhao and Junjia, April 1994)
Table 2.2: Domestic Phone Charges
(China Telecom Newsletter, January 1995)
Prices are per minute and in Chinese yuan (US$1 = Y8.44)
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I____ _ 1978 1980 1985 1990 1991 1 1992
GNP 3,588 4,470 6,558 17,695 19,855 24,000
25% 47% 170% 12% 21%
Trade 206 381 696 1,154 1,357 1,656
85% 83% 66% 18% 22%
Telecommunications 11 13 30 82 204 286
18% 131% 173% 149% 40%
Distance (km) Price I Distance (km) Price I
Up to 25 0.10 400-600 0.70
25-50 0.20 600-800 0.80
50-100 0.30 800-1000 0.90
100-150 0.40 1,000-1500 1.00
150-200 0.50 1500-2000 1.10
200-400 0.60 Over 2000 1.20
Table 2.3: International Rates
(China Telecom Newsletter, January 1995)
Prices are per minute and in Chinese yuan (US$1 = Y8.44)
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From MPT China Hong Kong Telecom CTM (Macau)
To
Australia 3.14 0.93 2.25
China - 0.31 0.43
Hong Kong 0.50 - 0.39
Japan 2.19 1.02 1.50
Macau 0.50 0.27
Singapore 2.95 0.89 1.50
South Korea 2.19 1.02 1.88
Taiwan 2.05 1.02 1.50
Brazil 4.71 2.04 2.25
France 3.54 1.62 2.25
India 3.54 1.55 2.25
UK 3.54 1.14 2.25
USA 3.14 1.11 2.25
Chapter 3
China's Telecommunications
System
3.1 Network Topology
According to Xu Shanyan, director of the MPT's General Office, the total number of ex-
change lines in service in China at the end of 1993 was 30.48 million, making it one of the
ten largest networks worldwide.(Hayes, October 1994) Around 72% of the public telephone
network has been digitized, along with 98.6% of the long distance digital exchange network.
It is expected that by 1996, there will be 19 long distance fiber optic lines, and the entire
country's long distance telephone network will be automated. By the year 2000 there is
an expected increase of 84 million switching systems and 1.5 million long distance lines.
Despite these developments, however, there are more than one million homes waiting for
telephones, with an average waiting period of six months. Long distance lines are scarce,
connection rates are low, and more than half of the country's villages and small towns do
not have any phones at all. (Cai, 1994)
Domestic long distance channels have been growing rapidly, at 16% annually over the
past decade. However, as of 1994, only 55% of the long distance traffic is controlled by au-
tomatic switches, and only half is transmitted through- microwave, modern cable (including
fiber optic), and satellite transmission networks. The remainder still goes through overhead,
open-wire lines. (Bien, 1994)
In many rural areas, the local network is not connected to the long-distance network.
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Instead, only one or two phones in the nearest town or county post office are linked. The
wait for use of such phones is usually many hours long and in 1988, the MPT estimated
that about half of long distance calls did not go through.
The national network combines the use of both manual and automatic switching in four
hierarchical levels. The basic skeleton for the national network is formed by six interprovin-
cial centers - Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Shenyuan, Xian, and Chengdu - where several
provinces of a major region interconnect. Beijing also has direct circuits to all the provin-
cial capitals. These centers, along with auxiliary centers in Tianjin, Nanjing, Lanzhou, and
Chongqing form a mesh, in which one site is able to communicate directly with any other
site. Below the top layer, networks generally form star configurations, in which traffic goes
through a central hub. The second level, located at provincial capitals, handles connections
for intraprovince communications. The third layer of the network has nodes in the large
cities which connect circuits between counties, and the fourth level at county (ian) centers
connect circuits within a district and tend to be located with the seats of county govern-
ment. A call from one county center to another part of the country might thus be routed
through seven different circuits at different levels. (Liang and Zhu, 1994)
3.1.1 Measures of Telephone Density
One of the greatest difficulties in studying the Chinese telecommunications system is un-
derstanding the meaning of various statistics. Not only do numbers from different sources
often conflict, but China often has a different way of calculating various measures. Most
importantly, the actual number of handsets, or telephones, is not usually reported in world
statistical data because there may be many actual phones per line. Instead, the World Bank
and other international agencies report telephone penetration or telephone density as mean-
ing the number of access lines per 100 population. By contrast, China reports telephone
density as the number of physical telephone handsets per 100 people, a number which is
typically about 40% higher.
In general access lines are the number of lines which run from the local exchange office
to households. This number, which is less than the number of actual telephones, is generally
larger than the number of exchange lines, which measures the ability to connect to other
lines within the local area of one switch. This is again greater than the number of trunk
lines, which connect between switches. Toll trunk lines are long distance lines between
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switches (for example, between cities) whereas exchange trunk lines are local lines between
switches. The term "main line" seems to be used alternately for "trunk" and "exchange".
Furthermore, the reported switching capacity in China is much lower than the number of
installed lines because of underground installation problems and chronic funding shortages.
For example in 1988 only 68% of urban and 57% of rural exchange capacities were connected
to subscribers. (Bien, 1994) In 1990 there were 7.8 million working lines with 10-12 million
lines of installed capacity. (Wright, 1995.) At the end of 1995 there were a projected 50
million exchange lines installed but only 23 million working. This has occurred because, of
the components necessary for a functional line, switching equipment is the cheapest, after
which is the cost of long distance lines. The access pairs for the local loop from the local
switch to households is significantly more expensive. Thus China has bought and installed
a lot of switching equipment as it has looked ahead to modernization, but most of this
capacity remains unconnected because of lack of money. Furthermore, in many rural areas
cables are damaged or not functional.
Another confusing aspect of these statistics is that the MPT tends to divide its statistics
into "urban" and "rural" regions. However, in many provinces "urban" statistics count only
the capital of the region with "rural" encompassing not only the truly sparsely populated
and remote areas, but also small towns and small industrial centers. As a result, rural-urban
disparities in service access and quality may be even greater than they appear. (Wright,
1995)
3.1.2 Targets for 2000
By the year 2000, the government plans to more than double the number of telephone
sets in the country to 78 million, to reach a telephone density of 5-8%. Targets have also
been set that double exchange capacity and toll trunk lines to 100 million and 1.4 million,
respectively.(MPT, 1993) To achieve these goals, the MPT will have to purchase over $10
billion worth of switches and transmission equipment in 1995 and around $52 billion in
infrastructure between 1996 and 2000.(Zita, January 1995)
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3.2 Sector Organization
From the 1950s to the 1970s, China's state-owned telecommunications system was semi-
military, highly centralized, and seen basically as a tool for administrative needs. When the
country started to reform economically, however, lack of funds at the state level devolved
authority for developing the telecom sector to the local level. The State Council issued
directive number 165 in 1979 which stipulated that in posts and telecommunications, the
government administration and business management should be separated. This was fol-
lowed by a "six-point instruction" from the State Council in 1984 which stipulated, among
other things, that responsibilities in the telecom industry should be shared among differ-
ent administrative levels, ministerial administration should be coordinated with regional
authorities, and the construction of. infrastructure should mobilize resources from all con-
cerned.(Lu, April 1994) Throughout all of this, telecommunications at the national level
was basically synonymous with the MPT.
3.2.1 Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications
The Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications is the traditional leader of the Chinese
telecommunications sector. In addition to being China's only public long distance car-
rier until very recently, the MPT also formulates and oversees implementation of telecom
policies, laws, plans, and reform programs; acts as the regulatory agency, acts as a liai-
son between China's central bureaucracy and the 31 semi-autonomous provincial carriers,
and manages a large part of China's telecom equipment manufacturing industries.(Bien
and Pham, 1994) The Department of Communications (DOC) of the MPT approves the
construction of dedicated networks and implements communications technology laws and
policies established by the Department of Policy and Laws (DPL). The Department of Sci-
ence and Technology (DST) coordinates standards setting as well as running the MPT's
training institute for telecommunications technology. Finally, the MPT's responsibilities
also include participating in international telecommunications organizations such as the
ITU; coordinating the dedicated networks of various state organs; and directly operating
and managing various telecommunications and postal services. (See Figure 3-1 for an orga-
nizational chart of the MPT.)
Including its reporting entities, the MPT has fifteen headquarters and around 1,200,000
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employees, 49% of whom work in the telecommunications branches. It has a reputation for
being one of the most conservative ministries of the government. In addition to the MPT, a
number of other central authorities also have some control over certain telecommunications
sector matters. These include the
* State Planning Commissions (SPC) - Responsible for China's general planning and
economic policy, establishes targets such as those required by the telecommunica-
tions industries. The SPC approves the MPT's five year plans. These approvals are
necessary for access to "mandatory commodities."
* State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC) - Oversees the work of civilian
research institutes subordinate to several ministries and coordinates the science policy
with state's planning and budgeting operations.
* National Defense, Science, Technology, and Industry Commission- Activities include
development of communications satellite and many military applications.
* State Pricing Board (SPB) - Approves or disapproves prices recommended by MPT
and other ministries.
* Ministry of Finance (MOF) - Regulates national fiscal policies, reviews MPT's finan-
cial planning and performance.
* Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade - Sets policy and coordinates access
to foreign credit.
* National Administrative Bureau of State-Owned Property (NABSOP) - Establishes
state policy to promote efficient use of state-owned products.
* Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industry (MMBEI) - Makes policy in
the machine building and electronic sector.
* Ministry of Television and Broadcasting (MTB) - Performs radio and television broad-
casting services including using transmission links provided by the MPT (Wellenius,
World Bank Report No. 9413-CHA, 1992)
* All of these organs are subordinate to the State Council, the executive organ of the
National People's Congress (NPC). See Figure 3-2.
MPT's position as the single entity responsible for all telecommunications services has
lead to a great deal of inefficiency as different parts of the bureaucracy often interfere with
each other. Hence MPT has recognized the need for establishing "an institutional structure
that clearly defines separate and distinct roles for policy-making, regulation, and manage-
ment" (Melody, 1991). Functional separation should not only improve policy making and
regulations, but also allow service enterprises to operate more efficiently. The Ministry fi-
nally split itself nominally into two parts in 1994. The MPT is now the national regulator,
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analogous to the FCC in the United States, while the Directorate General of Telecommu-
nications (DGT) became the dominant carrier responsible for long distance, international,
and national data networks. For now however, the division is in name only. MPT is still
synonymous with the national monopoly.(Zita, 1995.)
It has also been recognized that postal and telecommunications services should even-
tually have completely separate ownership and management, as they do in countries such
as the USA, Canada, India, Brazil, Japan, and many others. Whereas the labor produc-
tivity and technological intensity of telecommunications is likely to improve rapidly, postal
services will remain very labor intensive and have less scope for efficiency improvements.
Separation of posts and telecommunications has, in fact, begun with the recent creation of
the Directorate General of Posts (DGP) which is analogous to the DGT and serves local, na-
tional, and international mail. However, postal services continues to be cross-subsidized by
profits from telephone network services. Further separation will probably occur only when
there is enough additional traffic to overcome the costs of fragmenting the organization into
smaller parts.
Directly under the MPT in the telecommunications hierarchy are thirty provincial Posts
and Telecommunications Administrations (PTAs) which function as the medium managerial
level and oversee operations in the twenty-one provinces, five autonomous regions, and four
special municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou). At the third level, each
of some 350 municipal/city Posts and Telecommunications Enterprises (P&T's) provide
local service in nearby urban and rural areas, and coordinate development and operation
of the long distance networks among subordinate P&T's. Thirty of these are located in the
provincial capitals, but these are distinct from the PTAs. Finally there are about 2,150
county level P&Ts which provide local service in the county capitals and extensions to the
county rural areas. Local governments have some say in P&T activities within their borders.
This control was expanded by the State Council in 1990 when the county level P&T's were
made responsible for township and village telephones, but with administration vested in
the county government.(Liang and Zhu, 1994.) Local operators are generally more aligned
with the municipal government than with the MPT, and regional development constraints
or goals are not always in agreement with plans promulgated from Beijing.
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3.3 Other National Telecommunications Entities
3.3.1 Private Networks
Private networks, also known as "dedicated networks" have been an important part of the
national communications infrastructure since 1977. As various large users realized that the
MPT would be unable to provide the needed networks, they went to the State Council and
received approval for setting up their own networks. Among the operators of specialized
national networks are the Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Water and Power, Ministry of
Electronics, Ministry of Water and Power, Bank of China, New China News Agency, and
the Peoples Liberation Army. Although accurate information about the number of local
lines in service in these dedicated networks is not available, a rough estimate is about 10%
of the public main network.(Wellenius, World Bank, Report No. 9413-CHA)
The lack of coordination between the public and private networks has resulted in many
cases of repetitive construction of networks, signal interference, and technological incompat-
ibility. (Lu, 1994.) This pattern is indicative of China's centrally planned economy which
gave local leaders an incentive to devote resources to "empire building" in order to maintain
their power base, but which resulted in many needlessly duplicated projects.
To counter this tendency, the State Council issued Directive number 54 in 1990 to
enforce coordination between public and private networks.(Lu, 1994) Since then, some of
these private networks have been used not only for the specialized needs of the owners, but
also to overcome constraints from shortages in the public networks. For example, the Min-
istry of Railways (MOR) system, which is the largest dedicated network with 250,000 lines
connected to automatic exchanges in 750 places and remote telephones in 2000 additional
locales, is now partly interconnected with the MPT's public network. Local calls can be
made between MPT and MOR subscribers, and in places with no MPT service at all, MOR
provides occasional public service by relaying messages to the next MPT exchange. MOR
has also connected main suppliers such as the power company to its telephone exchanges, to
facilitate maintenance. Other dedicated networks now have similar interconnections with
the public system.(Lu, 1994.)
Dedicated networks which connect a ministry or national commission to large-scale
industrial enterprises are usually two or three-tiered star-shaped networks, whereas other
mixed type networks use a mesh between centers of higher order and a star configuration
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from centers to lower-order stations. Because these networks are generally smaller than
public networks, and because the ministries or other groups which own them generally are
able to make large investments, digitalization and other new technologies will penetrate
faster than in the public networks. For example, China National Petroleum & Chemical
Company expects to have a satellite-based, interactive voice, data, and fax network covering
2000 sites by 1997. (Liang and Zhu, 1994) Currently the ministries operate voice as well
as data networks including transmissions systems of fiber optic cables, microwave systems,
and VSATs (very small aperture terminal satellites).
3.3.2 National Alternative Service Providers
The inadequacy of the telecommunications sector was highlighted first by Li Peng's Elec-
tronics Leading Group, or ELG of 1985-1988, followed by the Science and Technology
Commission and State Planning Commission. This attention, together with reforms the
state enterprise, fiscal, and monetary structure of the 1990s, gave urgency to the need for a
more developed telecommunications sector. Partly out of these concerns came the MPT's
agreement in late 1993 to give up its monopoly position as the sole legal operator of public
interprovincial voice and data networks. Thus began the liberalization of the basic service
market in telecommunications, which was marked by the arrival of two new public entrants,
Ji Tong and Lian Tong, into the market. The MPT fought hard to retain its monopoly
status but was ultimately unable to prevail against the combination of political pressure
and unmet demand for services. Pressure for this move came largely from other ministries
hoping to open up their own private networks to the public. Liberalization was eventually
achieved not only because of the power of these ministries but also because of the political
clout of supporters of the new companies, including Vice Premier Zou Jiahua and Vice
Premier Zhu Rongji.("Competition..,"Pyramid Research, April 1994)
3.3.3 Ji Tong
Ji Tong Communications Corporation was founded in May 1993 and given final approval
by the State Council in September of that year. With twenty-six different shareholders, it
is China's largest communications equity consortium. It is officially owned by the Ministry
of Electronics Industry (MEI), and the president, Lu Shouqun has close ties to Communist
Party Secretary Jiang Zemin and was formerly second-in-command at the ME. The MEI
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holds the controlling stakes in Ji Tong through state-owned enterprises such as the 54th
Research Institute of the MEI and China Electronic Systems Engineering Corporation.
Other investors include Nanjing Wireless Factory, Beijing Municipal Electronic Office, China
Great Wall Industries, and the Bank of China.("Competition..,"Pyramid Research, April
1994)
Ji Tong's stated mission from the government was to develop a nationwide informa-
tion infrastructure through its role as equipment supplier and possible owner of the "Three
Golden Projects." The largest of the three, Golden Bridge (Jin Qiao) is to be a national
economic information network which includes the construction of a satellite-based ISDN
backbone connected to various private networks. In addition to its use for financial and
macroeconomic information by stock exchanges and financial institutions, the central gov-
ernment in Beijing will use it to assist in macroeconomic planning and monitoring. Golden
Customs (Jin Guan) is the second project, planned as a national foreign trade and customs-
related information network that would exchange data by email and/or an EDI (Electronic
Data Interchange) network. Finally Golden Card (Jin Ka) is to help China reduce its
reliance on a cash economy, which has contributed to inflation, by forming a nationwide
network supporting ATMs, credit cards, and debit cards. There have been indications that
this network would ulimately be owned by the financial institutions though Ji Tong will
construct and manage the project. ("Competition..,"Pyramid Research, April 1994))
Many foreign firms have viewed deals with Ji Tong as a way of getting their foot in
the door to future investment opportunities. (See section 4.3 for a description of some of
these investments.) Although holding equity in network operators is still banned, foreign
companies have been making more limited partnership deals in equipment manufacturing
and the like.
3.3.4 Lian Tong
Perhaps even more significant than Ji Tong was the formation of China United Telecommu-
nications Corporation, or Lian Tong, China's second long distance voice operator. Though
formed at the same time as Ji Tong, it was granted final approval by the State Council in
December 1993, and was not inaugurated as a state corporation until July 1994.
The existence of Lian Tong is a reflection of the powerful interests that the potential
value of telecommunications services have attracted. The Ministry of Electronics Industries
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(MEI), Ministry of Railways (MOR), and the Ministry of Electric Power (MEP) conceived of
and largely control Lian Tong, with MEI as the primary catalyst behind the venture. Each
of the MEI, MOR, and MEP have 100 million RMB of equity in Lian Tong. Other owners
(with 80 million RMB of equity each) include China International Trust & Investment
Corporation, China Resources Holding, China Everbright International, Huaneng Group
(a subsidiary of the Ministry of Power), several subsidiaries of the Ministry of Foreign
Trade & Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), and around ten others, with more shareholders
expected in the future.("China: Lian Tong, EIU, Aug. 8, 1994) The People's Liberation
Army (PLA) was originally interested in joining the consortium as well but later declined
official involvement.
The close ties between MEI and the current core leaders has enabled Lian Tong to
withstand strong opposition from the MPT. (Zita, Jan. 1995.) Not only does Lian Tong
have the backing of the State Council, but also of China's president Jiang Zemin, Vice
Premier Zou Jiahua, and Li Tieying, formerly the minister of the MEI, and now the leader
of the powerful enterprise reform commission charged with restructuring state enterprises.
Currently Lian Tong's role in competing with MPT's can best be described as "compet-
itive coordination." The terms of reference as stipulated by the State Council dictate that
Lian Tong should use the MOR and MEP's redundant network capacity to provide voice,
data, radio, and cellular services to the public, concentrating primarily in areas where these
services do not exist or where those provided by the MPT are inadequate. This is not the
full-fledged competitive network that some have described it as, but it has certainly laid
the groundwork for competition, especially in value-added service provision. Lian Tong is
expected to move quickly beyond being a network using redundant capacity as it aims for
the lucrative long distance routes between large cities and coastal provinces. It will aim at
both the business and residential markets. According to Chief Engineer Tang Qi of Lian
Tong's Guangzhou branch, "if we offer a better service than the MPT, we'll get customers."
("China Unicom.." 1995) In fact, Lian Tong chairman Zhao Weichen announced at the
launching ceremony their goal of capturing 10% of China's long distance telecommunica-
tions market, one third of mobile services business, and offering international services by
the end of the decade. ("China: Lian Tong, EIU, Aug. 8, 1994) There has been some
interconnection agreement reached between the MPT and Lian Tong, though the details
are unclear. ("China Unicom.." 1995)
45
Other goals set out by Zhang Shukui, Lian Tong's president and former governor of
Guizhou Province include upgrading existing networks of the MOR and MEP to supply
services to the public, for example upgrading and building four backbone optical fiber cables
along the MOR's rail tracks; building satellite networks and PCNs (personal communication
networks); joining Ji Tong in building the "Three Golden Projects"; and establishing a
national cellular mobile communications network with roaming capability between seven
or eight major cities (though recently a new mobile company has been established directly
under the control of the MEI rather than Lian Tong). (Xu, July 1994) With such ambitious
targets, Lian Tong has been actively seeking foreign partners for funding. Thus far it has
signed Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) and actual agreements with companies
such as USA's Bell South, Pacific Link of Hong Kong, and Excellent Group of Malaysia. (Xu,
July 1994) Close international attention will focus on Lian Tong's role in the opening up of
the telecommunications sector to foreign companies.
One such MOU was signed between Lian Tong and GTE in January 15, 1995, for the
two companies to enter into a long-term strategic alliance including joint research and
development; and a joint-venture company to be headquartered in Beijing. This office
would assist Lian Tong with technological and management support for projects in China
and abroad. GTE was due to open an office in Beijing in March, and other projects were
yet to be determined at the time. Among those present at the signing of the MOU were
Lian Tong Deputy General Manager Guo Guan Min, GTE chairman Michael T. Masin;
as well as director of the SETC (State Economy and Trade Commission) Wang Zhongyu,
Minister Hu Qili of the MEI, Minister Shi Dazheng of the MOP, Minister Han Xubin of
the MOR, and vice-premier Zou Jiahua, and the US's Henry Kissinger.(China Telecom,
January 1995.)
The dynamics between Lian Tong and the MPT are at the core of the changing nature
of the telecommunications sector. The MPT remains conservative and unwilling to give
up its monopoly. Meanwhile the MEI has more money, is more efficient, and has been
gaining more support from the State Council in its telecoms operations. Although the
MPT retains a final say in policy issues, it is members of the MEI, not the MPT, who
are working with the US Department of Commerce's Information Technology Subgroup
on issues of telecommunications technology transfer. The importance of the core group of
powerful leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Zhou Jiahua in their support for Lian Tong and
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its backers; as well as the role of the various ministries of the bureaucracy in determining
the future of the sector is quite evident.
Thus it is also worth remembering that Lian Tong as it currently exists is not a very
coherent single entity, having arisen from a coalition of powerful ministries each wanting
to get its foot in the door of a lucrative new business. It is not clear how these and new
stakeholders will pool their resources and work together. Relationships between Lian Tong
and local entrepreneurs, and between Lian Tong and foreign investors have yet to be clearly
defined. Lian Tong's future investments are likely to be guided by past experience rather
than corporate policy or telecommunications law.
3.3.5 The People's Liberation Army
The People's Liberation Army is another player to watch as the telecommunications sector
undergoes reform. The PLA has recognized that secure and robust communications are
central to modern warfare. It is also concerned that service quality on the public networks
which it now uses for nonstrategic communications will deteriorate as traffic volume grows
rapidly. Thus although the PLA rejected the possibility of taking an equity position in Lian
Tong, the PLA has its own commercial ambitions in telecommunications and may still take
a role in Lian Tong at some point in the future.
Indeed the PLA already commands a favorable position in many aspects of telecommu-
nications development in the name of national security. It enjoys vast rights-of-way holdings
and wide operational latitude in every major municipality. Similarly because the State Ra-
dio Regulation Commission (SRRC) is under the joint jurisdiction of the State Council and
the Central Military Commission, the PLA has preference in radio spectrum allocation.
Thus far the PLA has launched Yuan Wang, a major paging operation in Beijing, as well
as playing an important role in Hua Meil in Guangzhou.(Zita, Jan. 95)
3.4 Service Access and Quality
National telephone density in China has grown from 0.05% in 1949 to 0.13% in 1957,
to 0.75% in 1990. The 1994 penetration rate of 2.2%, corresponding to 1.46 lines per
100, (Zita, 1994, MPT 1993) indicates the recent rapid growth of telephone access, but
'See Section 4.4 for more information about Hua Mei.
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the system is nowhere near meeting the pent-up demand. It is still among the lowest
for large developing countries and lags far behind the newly industrialized and developed
countries, where telephone (line) density is around 40%. For less developed countries,
the World Bank considers a 10% penetration rate as a good target. (Wright) Service
quality and access is especially difficult in rural and remote regions, though the situation
has improved tremendously since 1952 when only 84 cooperative farms in the entire country
had telephones. (Noam, 1994)
Telephone line density varies greatly among provinces. For example in 1992 when the
nationwide average density was 1.03 telephone lines per 100 people, Henan had a density
of 0.4, the autonomous regions an average of 0.9, and Shanghai, 5.9 per 100. (World Bank,
Report No. 13548-CHA, 1993) Furthermore, the gap between rural and urban, and core vs
peripheral areas seems to be growing. This year, with an overall phone penetration rate of
2.2% the urban penetration rate was 9 percent, and in very large cities and coastal regions,
as high as 20%.(Cai, 1994) (See Table 3.2 for teledensities in selected coastal cities.)
In addition, China has much fewer pay phones than other developing countries. In
1990, there were 46,000 payphones in China's urban areas, or two payphones per 10,000
urban residents. According the World Bank, average for developing countries is five to one
hundred per 10,000 urban residents. (Bien, 1994)
3.4.1 Service Indicators
The high demand for phone access has encouraged the use of many PBXs (private branch
exchanges) for offices and local loops, further increasing congestion and decreasing call-of-
completion rates. This contributes to the large difference between the number of telephones
per 100 population and the number of lines per 100. In 1991 although only about 6% of
urban lines in service were used as trunks for PBXs, they supported approximately 47% of
connected telephones, a higher proportion than in any other country. (World Bank, Report
No. 13548-CHA, 1993).
Telephone service is particularly congested and almost unusable at peak business hours
in many places. The average call completion rate is about 58% for local calls and 31% for
domestic long distance (see Table 3.1). Call completion requires availability of a dialtone
when one picks up the phone; the presence of a free line for each of the connections from
the local loop to trunk lines back to the local loop; and someone to pick up the phone. A
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rough guess for industrialized countries is 70% (Wright), although in places such as the US
where it is possible to measure the rate without counting the times when the receiving party
does not pick up the phone, call completion rates for local area calls are greater than 98%
(Wright). Experience in other countries suggests that these low rates are due primarily to
the shortage of lines. Call completion rates for domestic long distance calls vary among the
provinces, with Shanghai having one of the lowest rates in 1992 at 42%. This is probably a
reflection of call volume. These rates have improved in most of the country in the past few
years as the number of long distance circuits have increased by an average of 39% a year
since 1989.
The reported average of 5.3 faults per 100 lines per month in China is considerably
better than in many other developing countries. For example, in 1992 India reported 19
faults per 100 lines. Technological advancements have significantly improved performance.
The average duration of faults in switching and inter-office facilities shortened from 4.7
hours in 1988 to 0.2 in 1992 with the introduction of fiber optic digital inter-exchange
facilities and digital stored program control.(World Bank, Report No. 13548-CHA, 1993)
As with other aspects of telecommunications, the reliability of the system varies widely
among provinces, from an average of 0.03 faults per 100 lines per month in Jiangsu in 1992,
to 21 in Shanxi. In addition to technological variations, the disparity can also be attributed
to differences in maintenance levels, availability of test equipment, reporting and recording
procedures, etc. (World Bank, Report No. 13548-CHA, 1993).
3.4.2 Unmet Demand
The number of outstanding registered applicants for telephone service in urban areas grew
from 0.5 million outstanding in 1988 to 1.6 million in 1992, or 17% of total lines in service.
In Shanghai, outstanding registered demand was as high as 71.5% of lines in service. Not
only are the numbers growing, but outstanding applicants are not a completely accurate
reflection of unmet demands since a large number potential customers do not even bother
putting themselves on the waiting lists. Furthermore, demand registration is restricted by
installation fees. While the high fees are useful for financing investments in telecommu-
nications and in rationing the scarce supply, they obscure the full magnitude of service
demand.
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Table 3.1: Quality of Telephone Service
Region j (1) l (2) (3) (4) l (5) (6)
MUNICIPALITIES
Beijing 1.75 30.00 70.00 0.10 48.51 30.19
Shanghai 7.53 89.00 11.00 0.01 42.40 28.55
Tianjin 5.05 98.00 2.00 0.05 - 27.50
Average: 4.78 72.33 27.67 0.05 45.36 28.75
PROVINCES
Anhui 3.15 97.00 3.00 0.15 54.92 40.78
Fujian 8.99 99.00 1.00 0.04 60.18 34.22
Gansu 0.23 62.00 38.00 0.01 65.73 64.54
Guangdong 1.77 93.00 7.00 0.12 47.36 30.05
Guizhou 1.37 56.00 44.00 0.02 65.47 24.80
Hainan 1.10 99.00 1.00 0.38 46.09 20.68
Hebei 2.21 100.00 0.00 0.49 62.35 30.28
Heilongjiang 1.94 98.00 2.00 0.61 61.92 22.98
Henan 4.00 99.00 1.00 0.56 68.84 28.90
Hubei 11.77 99.00 1.00 0.05 63.40 23.00
Hunan 13.08 99.00 1.00 0.05 56.98 40.16
Jiangsu 0.03 99.00 1.00 0.33 45.62 21.92
Jiangxi 9.87 100.00 0.00 0.49 56.70 31.86
Jilin 3.90 92.00 8.00 0.34 52.81 28.56
Liaoning 9.52 71.00 29.00 0.49 42.58 27.34
Qinghai 4.00 77.00 23.00 0.02 66.41 35.41
Shaanxi 21.40 96.00 4.00 0.24 57.82 33.24
Shandong 6.67 100.00 0.00 0.72 66.04 30.53
Shanxi 9.02 99.00 1.00 0.33 65.35 27.32
Sichuan 4.37 89.00 11.00 0.34 60.28 24.42
Yunnan 0.31 100.00 0.00 0.01 50.74 29.64
Zhejiang 1.20 99.00 1.00 0.43 66.05 28.20
Average: 5.45 91.95 8.05 0.28 58.35 30.86
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
Guangxi 3.11 99.00 1.00 0.01 80.20 39.77
Inner Mongolia 4.14 98.00 2.00 0.01 59.20 23.35
Ningxia 1.74 40.00 60.00 0.16 56.29 28.65
Tibet 1.57 100.00 0.00 0.07 65.01 -
Xinjiang 15.65 69,00 31.00 0.02 55.47 30.26
Average: 5.24 81.20 18.80. 0.05 63.29 30.51
Country Average: 5.35 88.20 11.80 0.22 58.30 30.59
(1) Average fault reports per 100 working lines
(2) Percentage of faults from trunk cables and subscriber lines
(3) Percentage of faults from switching and interface facilities
(4) Average duration of faults before cleared (hours)
(5) Completion rate of local calls (effective calls as percentage of total calls dialed
(6) Completion rate of domestic long distance calls
Taken from World bank Report No. 13548-CHA, 1993. Original source, MPT, July 1993.
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Table 3.2: Teledensity in Coastal Cities and Special Economic Zones
(China Telecom Newsletter, November 1994)
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City Teledensity (%) New Installations Main Line per
as of Sept. 1994 100 people
Dalian 12.70 54757 8.20
Tianjin 15.60 145021 7.46
Qingdao 16.83 35328 11.09
Shanghai 15.50 325673 12.10
Ningbao 19.00 16889 7.81
Fuzhou 25.15 44722 14.21
Guangzhou 25.05 168271 17.16
Zhanjiang 16.80 16821 7.31
Shenzhen 82.24 75463 45.08
Zhuhai 40.29 35589 28.85
Haikou 36.13 31183 26.68
Chongqing 7.25 43213 4.46
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Chapter 4
Foreign Investment
4.1 Need for Foreign Investment
While progress on the development of the telecommunications network during the 1990s
has been rapid, it pales in comparison to government targets for the year 2000 and beyond.
According to Xu Shanyan, director of the MPT's General Office, the government plans to
achieve a 23.7% annual increase in traffic volume between now and the end of the century,
with 100 million exchange lines to be installed. The target for the year 2000 has been
quoted as a density of anything from 5-8 exchange lines per 100 people, with 40 out of 100
in urban areas. According to Xu, "..every household will be expected to have access to one
telephone. The waiting time for telephone installation will not be longer than one month..In
rural areas telephone connections will be made available to every individual village." (Asian
Communications, Oct 1994)
These forecasts have attracted the attention of the world's telecommunications industry,
from major switching equipment manufacturers, to smaller companies looking for export
companies, to other companies hoping to enter the service sector.
Estimates of the capital investments needed to install even a basic network ranges from
Salomon Brother's recent figure of $100 billion (Weiss and Wong, 1994) to other more
modest estimates of US $53 billion. To secure this much funding between now and the year
2000, China will clearly need to tap into as many sources of funding as possible. Multilateral
development agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are good
sources of funding, but are able to lend only when international competitive bidding is
used to procure equipment. That is, these agencies can only issue loans when the banks'
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particular lending requirements are met.(Hayes, Asian Communications, 1994)
World Bank
The World Bank is currently involved in a loan for one such project. It will include lending
money for investments between 1993-1997 which will add infrastructure as well as help
develop conditions for increasing competition and private participation. The long distance
investment program became part of China's 8th Five Year Plan, and the local telephone
expansion program would include investments in the 8th Five Year plan and 9th Five Year
Plan (1996-2000).
The 8th Five Year Plan provides for the installation of 50,000 km of additional fiber
optic cable in the long-distance network, for a total of 53,000 km. Bank financing includes
two of the fiber optic projects scheduled, or 21% of the scheduled expansion. In particular,
it would be a segment of long distance interprovincial network in the north from Beijing to
Lanzhou, and one in the south from Fuzhou/Hangzhou to Chengdu. (World Bank Report
No. 13548-CHA) The 8th Five year Plan also calls for the number of local switching lines
to increase from 12 million to almost 34 million. In Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and Jiangsu,
the three provinces which are the primary beneficiaries of the loan, the Bank would finance
about 14.4% of the expansion program of 6,392,800 lines. The Bank would also invest in
approximately 1.6% of total projected construction program expenditures while ancillary
network expenditures and rural additions would be funded through local financing. (World
Bank Report No. 13548-CHA)
The total project cost is estimated at US$623 million, with the proposed Bank loan of
US$250.0 million financing 40.1% of the total cost and 84.8% of the foreign exchange costs; a
grant of US$1.3 million from the Swedish BITS grant financing 2%; and the remaining cost
of US$371.7 million covered by the MPT. Project costs were estimated based on costs from
competitive bidding for similar projects in China. The costs would also finance consultants
to help the MPT develop an appropriate accounting system, train P&T accountants; finance
a study on tariff adjustment; and finance overseas training of MPT staff. Loans through the
Bank generally have certain restrictions; for example, the equipment in the Bank financed
components is specified in detail.
In addition to an investment component, the project includes a reform component which
requires the MPT to implement sector reform in collaboration with the PTAs of Jiangsu and
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Liaoning. It would also require accounting reform, rationalization of tariffs, and encouraging
development of a legal and regulatory framework.
In addition to the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is also lending to
China for the installation of optical fiber cables. The ADB approved a loan of $100 million in
1993 for multiplexing transmission equipment and optical fiber cables in two routes linking
Beijing to Wuhan, Guangzhou, Taiyuan and Xian. More than 400 million people live in the
targeted region. Of the total cost, US$175 million, ADB is covering 57% of the total and
all of the foreign-exchange component. ("ADB Approves..," Sept. 6, 1993.) The MPT will
oversee the work and contribute US$30 million, with other sources covering the rest.
Aside from international lending agencies, suppliers' credit, government export credits,
and private finance will form the rest of the borrowing requirements. The question of
private finance thus leads to the issue of how open the sector will be to foreign operators,
as discussed later.
4.2 Foreign Switching Manufacturers
The Chinese telecom industry has been marked by a sharp shift in financing patterns in
the past five years. Throughout the 1980s, foreign concessionary loans through bilateral aid
programs from Europe, Canada, and Japan were a significant source of funding. However,
these have tapered off since 1989. Thus MPT's annual foreign borrowing rose from $14.6
million in 1986 to $66 million in 1989, then dropped sharply to $39 million in 1990.(Gorham
and Chadran, March 1993) Bilateral funding agencies in countries including Germany, Swe-
den, Canada, France, Norway, and Australia are all expected to scale back their funding,
both because of the global recession and because of US pressure to avoid using concessionary
funds for commercially viable projects.
This measure was reinforced in 1993 when the OECD's (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development) Helsinki Package restricted the export grants for commer-
cially viable projects. In addition, Vice Premier Zou Rongji tightened controls on domestic
financing in mid-1993 as part of a package for cooling the overheated economy. These
developments have made financing much more difficult to obtain, leading the MPT and
local PTAs to make different decisions about competition in the switching market. What
was once an attempt to rationalize the market through preferential treatment for certain
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suppliers has become a highly competitive free for all.(Rehak, August 1994)
The digital switching market has traditionally been dominated by Alcatel, Siemens, and
NEC, but these suppliers now face growing challenges from AT&T and Northern Telecom.
In 1994, both AT&T and Northern Telecom announced major agreements with the MPT
and SPC for locally manufacturing digital exchanges.( Rehak and Wong, March 1995) Fur-
thermore, Swedish vendor LM Ericsson had started constructing a switch manufacturing
facility even before it announced its intention to join the market, and Fujitsu is rumored to
be entering the local supplier market. (See Figure 4-1), players in the switching market).
Local production is a priority for switching vendors, not only because of the difficulty
in obtaining soft-loan financing, but also because of restrictions on the Chinese side. For
example, in a six month period in 1994, the foreign loan cap was $720 million. In addition,
local joint ventures often run into difficulty financially because the MPT and local PTAs
have only limited funds of their own for equipment purchasing, and foreign government-
backed soft loans are technically not an option under some regulations. However, some
suppliers are still negotiating to use them for joint venture sales. (Rehak and Wong, March
1995)
While the heightened competition in the market has been good for the MPT as well
as local PTAs in terms of lower prices, subcommercial interest rates, and other special
concessions, the MPT has lost sight of its original goal of rationalizing the public switching
system by limiting the number of switching models in the network. Interconnection issues
are imminent, and will continue to be a serious problem as more of the country gets linked
together. Currently there is no structure or regulation guiding the number of manufacturers
and the types of equipment they install.
4.3 Ji Tong
The formation of Ji Tong was an important step towards liberalization of the telecom
sector and brought with it many opportunities for foreign companies to enter into the
Chinese market. Many companies have struck deals with Ji Tong in the hopes that they
will eventually lead to more direct participation in network operation in the future.
The first such deal was signed between Hong Kong paging operator Pacific Link (Pa-
cLink) and Ji Tong in September 1993. According to PacLink officials, this joint venture
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was formed primarily to provide Ji Tong with contacts and to help their management be-
come experienced at negotiating contracts and dealing with foreign suppliers. In return,
PacLink hopes to be in an advantageous position to operate mobile networks in China when
such an opportunity arises.(Pyramid Research Asia, April, 1994)
Another highly publicized joint venture known as Beijing Ji Tong-Bell South Commu-
nications & Information Engineering Co., Ltd., was signed between Ji Tong and Bell South
International (BSI) in January 1994. BSI was committed to investing $11.8 million in
June 1994, with an expected total of $30 million covering the entire project which includes
network planning, design, and engineering services for Ji Tong. Given the size of this invest-
ment, it seems clear that BSI expects to be involved in even more substantial operating or
applications projects later on. However, officials were quick to point out that BSI's current
role as technical advisor is in compliance with existing restrictions on foreign companies.
Other ventures that have been formed with Ji Tong include Champion Technology of
Hong Kong which has a $1.5 million deal to manufacture and sell trunking radio, cellular
radio, and paging systems; Hughes Network Systems which has been selected to provide
VSATs for the first trial phase of the Golden Bridge Project; and US supplier InterDigital
Communications Cooperation which will sell CDMA equipment for a mobile network in Bei-
jing. Foreign equipment suppliers will have the predominant role to play as Ji Tong builds
its planned networks, though other opportunities are opening up as well. IBM is reportedly
discussing a research and development joint venture with Ji Tong which would probably
conduct research and provide advice on data transmission network hardware.(Pyramid Re-
search Asia, April 1994)
4.4 The Service Market and Recent Developments
While China has been welcoming foreign suppliers for the telecommunications infrastruc-
ture, it has very firmly stuck to its "3 No's" policy of.refusing any foreign participation in
the ownership, management, or operation of telecommunications services networks. Rooted
in concerns about national security and pride, the ban on foreign involvement in the ser-
vice sector is nevertheless weakening as foreign operators begin to test the limits of direct
participation. These changes are coming at a time when MPT's authority as the single
state-owned monopoly has been modified by the formation of Lian Tong and Ji Tong and
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by its own split into the DGT as dominant carrier and MPT as regulator. As the sector
is reformed, however, no comprehensive regulatory regime has been able to clearly define
the new role of the MPT. A telecommunications law governing the industry was originally
supposed to be complete in 1995 but is now projected to be another couple of years in the
coming. Instead a confusing and ambiguous "policy of exceptions" has allowed "inconsis-
tent and fitful approval of new carriers and competitive service providers backed by political
constituencies outside of the MPT." (Zita, Jan 1995)
As a result, much international attention has been focused on attempts by various com-
panies to participate in the service market, especially Hong Kong investors trying to break
into radio paging and cellular radio projects. Many foreign analysts and investors believe
that China cannot meet the target of 100 million PSTN lines by the year 2000 without
direct foreign investment; according to this view, adoption of the global privatization model
is China's only rational choice. Nevertheless, the MPT has responded on several occasions
with stern pronouncements that foreign ownership and operation of telecommunications
services is not permitted.
For example, in May 1993 there was a press announcement about a joint venture be-
tween SCM Brooks Telecommunications and a Chinese company, Galaxy New Technology
Company to build and operate a modern telecommunications network in Guangzhou. When
the Guangzhou electronic equipment company was called, however, one manager claimed
that the company had an engineering department by the name of Galaxy Company Ltd
which had met with but did not reach an agreement with SCM Brooks. Another manager
declared that there was no such entity as Galaxy Company Ltd. According to a telegraphic
report prepared at the American Consulate in Guangzhou, the Consulate had contacted the
Guangzhou Post and Telecommunications Bureau for clarification on the matter and were
told that such a joint venture was impossible. They were referred to a press announcement
from the MPT three days following the news about the Sino-US Joint Venture. According
to this MPT announcement of May 10, 1993:
Mr. Xu Shanyian, a spokesperson for China's Ministry of Post and Telecommunications
reiterated: "In China, it is not permitted for foreigners, including Hong Kong, Macau, and
Taiwan entities, to participate in the joint management of postal or telecommunications
operations, and the policy prohibiting foreign capital from being directly invested in these
operations has not changed. All those who have violated the above principles should im-
mediately rectify their mistakes and stop the execution of any contracts that have already
been signed or are now being implemented.
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At the same time, Xu emphasized that telecommunications in China is under rapid devel-
opment, and to keep up the pace, China "will keep on carrying out the open policy and
import more foreign capital, equipment, and technology.(National Trade Data Banks, July
20, 1993)
Such incidents reflect the growing debate within China between advocates of liberal-
ization and the MPT which is afraid of losing its monopoly. This debate came to a head
again towards the end of 1993 when Shanghai's reformist mayor Huang Ju suggested in New
York that foreign companies might be allowed to play a greater role in the city's telecom
development.(Business China, EIU, July 25, 1994)
Once the Pacific Rim's leading financial center, Shanghai has the potential to be in this
position again. In order to do so however, it must quickly modernize its telecommunications
sector. Unfortunately, both a shortage of funds to pay for its telecommunications expan-
sion program and the central government's policy of retaining full control over network
operations have prevented the many foreign firms keen on investing from entering this area.
Writing in a Chinese telecommunications journal, deputy director of Shanghai's PTA,
Cheng Xiyuan, listed a wide range of sources of investment capital such as loans, collective
investment groups, leasing of facilities, adjusting tariff rates, and shared stock. While he
did not specifically mention foreign involvement, the article did suggest that Shanghai at
least was waiting for the central government to relax its controls on telecommunications
operation.(Business China, July 25, 1994) Meanwhile, mayor Huang Ju reportedly told
leading Western telecom operators that he favored a "pilot" project in Shanghai under
which foreign operators would invest in building and operating a new network.(Financial
Times, February 25, 1994)
While the MPT again quickly denied that foreigners would be allowed either as equity
partners or to fill a management role in networks operations, recent reorganization of the
sector suggests that the likelihood of such changes is increasing. Professor Li Yining of the
National People's Congress noted that while China was "not ready for a change of pol-
icy," when market conditions "matured" there would be "no reason why foreign businesses
cannot take part in the operations of telecommunications networks in China." He also
listed three necessary developments for this change to occur: local industry strengthening
to the point where it is no longer dependent on preferential government treatment, technical
improvements to an internationally competitive level, and changes in service charges and
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revenue sharing. According to Li, "..as these problems are essentially technical in nature,
it seems highly likely that they can be resolved in the future." (Financial Times, February
25, 1994)
The formation of Lian Tong is especially important in assessing changes in the telecom
sector. According to Vice Premier Zou Jiahua in a statement in China Daily, he hoped Lian
Tong would be allowed to make "bold experiments in cooperating with foreign partners
and introducing foreign funds" to meet its investment requirements.(Business China, EIU,
August 8, 1994)
If Lian Tong is successful, which seems likely given the backing it has from the State
Council, foreign firms will be waiting eagerly to make deals on some form of operations
in the network in addition to the manufacturing ventures already underway. Once this
happens, Shanghai could use its special status of being directly under the administration
of the central government to bypass administrative layers including the MPT and appeal
directly to the State Council for special powers to encourage its development. This is only
one of many ways in which the entrance of Lian Tong into the telecom picture changes
foreign perspective on the continuing ban on network operations.
In addition, the general manager of Lian Tong's Guangzhou branch, Luo Zhiyong, re-
cently invited foreign investors to form a construction joint venture with the Guangzhou
South China Telecommunications Investment Corporation, a shareholder of Lian Tong's
Guangzhou branch. After this step, the network could be rented to the Guangzhou branch
and the foreign partner given a certain portion of profit guaranteed by the corporation. This
new approach would again allow foreign contractors limited entry into China's telecommu-
nications network. According to Mr. Luo, "The ratio of profit returns will be discussed in
each project, but after certain period of time, the network should be solely owned by the
corporation through a transfer of property rights." (South China Morning Post, February
15, 1995)
Further evidence of both the ambiguity and confusion over the foreign investment ques-
tion comes from other "exceptions" which have been granted thus far. The first was a
venture named Corporate Access launched by Richard Li Tzar-kai's Pacific Century Group.
The first foreign venture to run and install communication links in China, it is based in
Singapore and is restricted to carrying data within a company. For example it would be
used by a company with offices in both Hong Kong and China, or in other locations "where
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business opportunities are around, but there is a shortage of quality telephone lines." The
deal was struck between Corporate Access and one of the three mainland carriers, but Li
would not reveal whether it was MPT, Ji Tong, or Lian Tong. Furthermore, Li commented
concerning the ban, "It is specifically sanctioned by the State Council that such a service is
allowed." (South China Morning Post, November 11, 1994)
Another example is the recent joint venture between the China American Telecommu-
nications Company (Hua Mei) and SCM Brooks Telecommunications in Guangzhou, to
develop a new broadband ISDN network approved for high-speed data traffic and video.
With 50% foreign ownership by SCM Brooks, it is clearly a violation of a literal interpre-
tation of MPT's rules. In this case, however, not only will the network be China's first
ATM-based network, but the PLA organization COSTIND, Commission of Science and
Technology in the Industry of National Defense, is the lead Chinese partner of the project
- making it politically very difficult for MPT to object.(Zita, Jan. 1995) Hence, another
exception.
The most recent wrinkle in this debate came in February of 1995 when the State Council
decided to revise its policy on the information industry, entrusting Vice Premier Zou Jiahua
with the task of steering the course of change and developing the national information in-
dustry. Among the proposed changes were developing new incentives for foreign investment
in the domestic electronic and information infrastructure.
The major policy changes were then articulated by the State Planning Commission.
According to its Commissioner, Mr. Chen Jinghua, more extensive and effective coopera-
tion with foreign companies is necessary to ensure China's growth into the next century.
Specifically:
* Increase the ratio of information industry output to the GNP and the industry's labor
force, while restructuring the industry;
* Further expand information infrastructure, and accord telecom development greater
priority over other industry sectors, in order to expedite the building of information
superhighway;
* Speed up the development of electronic industry with the focus on micro-electronic
industry, which will be made a pillar industry in the national economy;
* Strengthen the development of information service and market;
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* Encourage local governments and state-owned enterprise groups to develop informa-
tion industry, in addition to increasing investment through the introduction of com-
petition mechanism;
* Expedite the process of the formulation and passage of the information/communications
law;
* Encourage foreign companies to invest in information infrastructure and other related
industries, encourage sino-foreign cooperation in developing information technologies
and speed up the process of the China's tap and integration into the international
economic information networks;
* Strengthen the work of training professional and skilled personnel.
This again suggests that important players to watch are Lian Tong and the local PTTs
because foreign investment in the services sector, should it happen, will begin here rather
than in the MPT. While MPT is unlikely to give up its official policy, decentralization
has allowed these other actors to take advantage of eager foreign investors. Furthermore
because there are so many foreign companies trying to enter the market, the PTTs have
found it easy to play the entities off one another, which is another reason that very few of
the deals have come into public light thus far.
Because both the local PTTs and the MPT do have this advantage of playing off foreign
competitors, it is quite unlikely that the service market will be opened in the immediate
future. However, the "policy of exceptions" pattern suggests that there will continue to be
innovative ways through which investors can step into the market without actually violating
a literal interpretation of MPTs official policy. For example in the case of Hua Mei, the
assets are leased to the Guangzhou telecommunications bureau. Models such as this in
which foreign entities are guaranteed a specified rate of return without owning the venture
directly, will become more and more widespread.(Zita, Jan, 1995)
Another popular variation is the build-operate-transfer (BOT) or build-transfer-operate
(BTO) arrangements. According to one analyst, "If you believe that China is going to
develop its economy then you have to believe that foreign investment will be allowed into
the telecommunications sector. Build, Operate, and Transfer; Build, Transfer, and Operate
and other similar type schemes are all possible as funding and provide a sufficient equity
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return for the investor. So would be licensing to telecommunications systems under a
revenue sharing arrangement. These schemes will ensure equity-like returns without having
to have a foreign operator." (Asian Communications, Oct. 1994) Thus far these have been
much more popular with local PTTs than with the MPT, though in October 1994 the
MPT agreed to two BOT-type agreements with Hong Kong Telecom. The first is a GSM
network in Beijing, and the second the installation and management of 13 inter-provincial
fiber networks though it has not been disclosed whether the final deal will be a lease or
BOT.(Asian Communications, Oct. 1994)
4.5 Interviews
Four representatives from American companies investing in the Chinese telecommunica-
tions sector were interviewed. Three were from large companies, and one from a smaller
investment firm; none wished to be identified. Each company, of course, hopes that China
will relax its ban on ownership, operation, and management of services. On the other
hand, none of the people with whom I spoke were able or willing to comment on when
they thought such a move might come. "It is very difficult to predict what the Chinese
government will do, or when they will do it," was the official word, though one person also
mentioned China's desire to enter the GATT and World Trade Organization which would
force a loosening of many present restrictions, possibly including that one.
According to two interviewees from telecommunications companies, there are many ru-
mors of "revenue sharing deals" being struck between foreign companies and local PTTs.
While none of these deals have been confirmed by the Chinese, there is little doubt that
a lot of activity is going on at the local level. Furthermore, each foreign company seems
to believe that some other companies probably have deals that in effect bypass the ban on
services; but no firms are willing to admit to such deals. This point was emphasized by all
the interviewees.
When business is done, deals are made, foreign companies work with both central head-
quarters and at the local level, but it is the local level which is drawing more attention.
When they could get away with it, some local PTTs have purchased switches without in-
forming Beijing. The most successful make these purchases with their own money, later
making excuses to apply exceptions to the rules which are supposed to control their pur-
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chases.
Another point that was stressed by several people was the present state of chaos in
terms of both policy and technical equipment. All wished for a more cohesive law or policy
guide from the Chinese end, though none saw this as a reason as yet to stop trying to work
in the market.
4.6 Experiences from Other Countries: The Asia-Pacific
Region
4.6.1 South Korea
Korea had a long history as an occupied country until the Potsdam Conference after World
War II, when it was divided into South and North Korea. Since then, South Korea has had
one of the most remarkable growth stories in the Pacific. Along with its economic success has
come progressive policies and success in telecommunications. With a telephone penetration
rate of 35 per 100 people as of 1991, South Korea has one of the highest telephone densities
in Asia.(Wellenius and Stern, 1994)
Most telecommunications infrastructure which had been installed by the Japanese was
destroyed by the end of the Korean War. After that, no major investments were made until
the first five-year economic plan in 1962. During the 1970s the level of unsatisfied demand
started to rise, so that by the late i970s, telecommunications in Korea suffered problems
typical of developing countries, including inefficient allocation of financial resources and a
backlog of unfilled orders. Waiting time for telephones was often more than a year, and a
black market for telephones developed. At the end of the 1970s, the government started
redirecting its industrial focus from heavy industry to electronics, including telecommu-
nications. In 1978, the government started making major investment in telecommunica-
tions with the launching of a national automatic telephone switching network supporting
subscriber demands for voice and data services. These investments were financed mainly
through price increases and foreign borrowing.
At the time, foreign currency needed to purchase foreign switching and transmission
facilities were in short supply. This, together with the poor harvests, shrinking demand for
exports, and the second oil crisis, lead the government to accumulate debt at a very rapid
pace as it underwent economic restructuring. Despite these difficulties, Korea continued to
65
expand telecommunications facilities unlike most developing countries where it was given a
very low priority around that time.(Choo and Kang, 1994)
Internal financing was also an issue at the time. The government was concerned that
increasing rates would increase the consumer price index. Nevertheless, it decided that
users should pay for network expansion, so local rates were more than doubled.
Prior to 1983, the basic law governing the industry was the Telecommunications Act of
1961, which was based on heavy government regulation of equipment, service offerings, rates,
and conditions. Major changes came between 1982 and 1983 with the enactment of a new
set of laws including the Telecommunications Basic Law, the Public Telecommunications
Business Law, the law on the Establishment of the Korean Telecommunications Authority
(KTA), and the passing of the Basic Telecommunications Act and Public Telecommunica-
tions Business Act. The acts moved the sector towards privatization and tried to separate
business operation from policy formulation. The laws provided that all telecommunications
businesses were carried out by common carriers designated by the Ministry of Communica-
tions (MOC) which would also coordinate the businesses. They also established the KTA as
a completely government-owned public corporation, which was given the management and
operation responsibilities previously held by the MOC. At the same time, DACOM (Data
Communications Corporation of Korea) was established as a private company given the
status of common carrier for the purpose of providing new services such as email, videotex,
etc.(Sung 1994)
Restrictions on the network began to be relaxed in 1985 and continued until 1991 when
virtually anyone was allowed to share lease lines with no service restrictions. The telecom-
munications laws were revised again in July 1989 and July 1991. The first revision made
the registration system for value added networks (VANs) theoretically less stringent. The
second law came out of a larger effort by the Korea Information Society Development In-
stitute (KISDI) to restructure the sector. It drew a. distinction between various service
categories: General Service Providers (basic telephony and data), Special Service Providers
(cellular, paging, other wireless); and Value Added Service Providers (data networks, email,
etc).Value added service providers were required to meet a registration requirement which
is also expected to be further liberalized with time. At the same time, a regulatory frame-
work was established which authorized new service providers, encouraging competition in
the sector.(Bruce, Robert R., and Jeffry P. Cunard, "Restructuring the Telecommunications
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Sector in Asia: An Overview of Approaches and Options," in Wellenius and Stern, 1994)
Also in 1990, KTA was renamed Korea Telecom and converted to a joint-stock company
which the government plans to privatize. These plans, which have been delayed partly be-
cause of the downturn in the Korean stock market, would bar any single shareholder from
owning more than 10 percent of Korean Telecom.(Bruce and Cunard)
Several factors motivated these changes towards liberalization at this time; namely,
pressure from major telecom users within the country and trade pressure from partners,
especially the US, for a more liberal and open telecommunications regime. The major
members of the Computer and Communications Promotion Association (CCPA) were in-
strumental in these matters. Among them are STM and Samsung Data Systems (SDS),
which are joint ventures of Lucky Goldstar with Electronic Data Systems (EDS) and Sam-
sung with IBM, respectively. (Sung, 1994) Businesses such as Reuters, the Associated Press,
and Citicorp also urged increased market access.
Like other countries in Asia, Korea has been very reluctant to remove restrictions on
foreign ownership of domestic telecoms. This includes ownership of Korea Telecom's shares,
and of providers of value added services. Korean resistance stemmed largely from the fear
that technology from the US and Japan would be advanced enough to freeze out most
Korean firms.(Choo and Kang, 1994) This may especially be of concern because Korea has
predominantly adopted American equipment and standards, and feels the need to develop
its own new services.(Sung, 1994) In 1987 the US started Market Access Fact Finding
(MAFF) talks with Korea concerning telecommunications. These resulted in an indirect
request in 1988 by the US for an opening of Korean markets. In 1989, in accordance with
the US Congress's Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, the US Trade Representative designated
the European Community and Korea as priority countries for negotiation.(Sung, 1994)
Nevertheless, until the beginning of 1994, foreign investors could hold no more than 50
percent of the shares of a Korean provider of value added services though this restriction
was lifted as a result of trade pressure. The restriction still stands for General Service
Providers however.
Significant foreign investment is expected in mobile services, as Korea is aggressively
introducing competition to this market. Several of the U.S. regional operating companies
are pursuing opportunities in Korea, though no foreign entity is allowed to own more than
one third of the voting stock of such a provider. Moreover, Korean Telecom and DACOM
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(Data Communications Corporation of Korea) which has provided all data communications
services for many years, have been excluded from the mobile services market. This is part
of a concerted attempt now to diversify the sector. In this vein, individual companies
have been barred from owning more than one-third of a Special Service Provider's voting
stock, and in October 1989, Korea Mobile Telecommunications Corporation (KMTC) sold
35 percent of its shares to its employees in the general public.(Bruce and Cunard)
Universal Service
Universal service was a stated goal of the Telecommunications Basic Law until the 1991
amendment rescinded this portion. However, universal service in South Korea is considered
almost complete in terms of telephone penetration.(Kim and Ro, 1993) Though there is
no precise definition, universal service is usually taken to mean that no preferential or
discriminatory treatment is given to customers because.of either place of residence or income
level; and that customers must be given access to telecommunications services at reasonable
rates. This concept can be traced back to the Communications Act of 1934 in the United
States, which then became the basis for similar acts in many other countries including
Korea. In the US, there is no assumption that "universal" means "uniform" but for Japan,
the concept does generally imply that rates are uniform for subscribers across the country.
This is also the case for South Korea. Universal service is still a primary objective of the
MOC, now defined in terms of information rather than just telephones, but most other
players in the sector now are leaning heavily towards an emphasis on liberalization and
competition rather than on access. The tension between the two approaches has yet to be
resolved.
One economic argument that has been used against universal service is on efficiency
grounds. Economists view universal service as a means to internalize a network externality
since subscribers who join the network benefit not only themselves but the other subscribers
as well. However, according to this argument once the network expands to the point where
it is now, marginal external benefits and hence the need to promote the goal diminish. Fur-
thermore, cross-subsidization has been criticized heavily for inefficiencies; and proponents
of deregulation have pointed out that telephone access demand is inelastic with respect to
changes in local call rates. Kim and Ro, however, disagree, stating that "this type of anal-
ysis and conclusion depends on the estimation method and the data used. Recently, Cain
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and Macdonald reported that the elasticities may be higher than previously estimated, and
that they increased in the 1980s." (Kim and Ro, 1993)
It seems likely that the Korean sector will continue on its path of liberalization and
deregulation, now emphasizing efficiency over its old equity approach. Nevertheless, the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration's (NTIA) 1988 report en-
larged the previously accepted goal to include other services such as fax, data transmission,
long-distance service, and mobile telephone service.(Kim and Ro, 1993)
Relevance to China
If China is to successfully modernize its telecommunications sector, it should of course
examine the successes and lessons to be drawn from other countries, especially those in
Asia. What made them successful, and can China try to do the same?
The major restructuring of Korea's telecom sector has been important to its continued
growth. Furthermore, the fact that there has been a telecom law in place, and the absence of
the kind of regulatory confusion found in China has been conducive to industry development.
As with the other "Four Tigers" - Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore - Korea's vibrant
economy has played an important role in the development of the telecom sector. An economy
that has been able to generate substantial resources for basic infrastructure development
has allowed Korea to focus now on new services.
Aside from the difference in the economies, the sociopolitical background of China and
Korea are also quite different. Unlike Korea which has had a long history of foreign occu-
pation and contact, China has a history of isolation. Korea's wariness of foreign investment
in telecommunications services has probably arisen more out of concerns about Japanese
and American technologies taking over the market, and less out of the simple dislike of
foreign entities that has characterized Chinese attitudes towards foreign investors in the
past. More importantly, despite the restrictions on foreign investment, Korea received a lot
of foreign funding for its telecommunications development. Finally, it is more difficult to
attract foreign loans in today's world economy than it was in the post-war environment in
which South Korea rapidly developing.
Among the things that Korea "did right," were giving high priority to the telecommu-
nications sector starting in the 1970s, and switching economic focus from heavy industry
to electronics and telecommunications at the time when it was experiencing a backlog of
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unfilled orders - exactly the problem China is facing today. China has now started along
this direction too, putting emphasis on light industries and especially telecommunications,
but the long lag time between now and when Korea started suggests that problems will not
disappear at once.
One major step in the development of the Korea telecommunications sector was the deci-
sion to raise service charges, which raised enough capital to continue expanding the network.
China, however, is expected to have more difficulty supporting such a price increase given its
larger population at a lower income level. While some customers will certainly be willing to
pay more for local service, these are more likely to be customers in urban areas who already
have access to phone service. On the other hand, detailed willingness to pay studies have
not been carried out for customer preferences throughout China, so that such measures
cannot be completely ruled out.
The longstanding presence of an official telecommunications law in Korea is also in
stark contrast to the Chinese situation. These laws are explicit and clear, and because
of the culture, and of the history of law, it is much easier for both domestic and foreign
investors to understand the rules.
Another difference between the Korean and Chinese approaches to the telecommunica-
tions sector has been the universal service concept. Whereas Korea's MOC has had this
as a stated goal for a long period of time, it is not an' explicit goal of the Chinese system.
This is due more to practical concerns than any ideological differences; China simply is not
at the stage where it can guarantee the installation of so many telephone lines. However,
the equity argument is often used in the debate over liberalization as a reason for keeping
the monopoly status of the MPT. The view that in competitive systems, the economically
weak are often disadvantaged, certainly has some validity; and if telecommunications is to
be considered a basic need like housing and food, it is necessary to bear these considerations
in mind. However, the fact is that China's MPT has not been able thus far to meet the
country's requirements and furthermore has not offered any new approaches dealing with
the problems of funding and unmet demand.
The sheer magnitude of China's development goals is also different from the Korean
situation. Although South Korea also developed its infrastructure very quickly, the dif-
ference between installing 2 million additional exchange lines to raise the penetration rate
from 3.4% to 8.4% ,in the Korean case, (Kim, Eun-Ju, March 1993) to installing an extra
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50 million to raise penetration from 3% to 6%, in the Chinese case, (Business China, May
1994) is significant. China needs to install as many lines each year as are in one of the
United States' seven Regional Operating Companies to meet its targets.
Because of the differences in the size of the problem and the sociopolitical environment
in South Korea and China, experiences from South Korea cannot be directly transferred
to China. Some of the solutions such as raising the basic user fee are not practical for the
Chinese economic situation. Furthermore, while Korea had a very isolationist stance for
foreign investment until very recently, it had a more liberal domestic policy than China. In
addition, South Korea has for political reasons had a lot of financial support from countries
such as the United States, which China has not been privy to. The largest question facing
China's development will be adequate funding, which in today's world economy will only
come from foreign investors. South Korea's traditional goal of universal access seems to
have been an important factor in achieving a high density rate; this is a concept that China
could develop for itself as part of a more coherent framework for the telecommunications
sector. Finally, the South Korean experience again suggests the need for a clearer legal and
regulatory framework.
4.6.2 Taiwan
Taiwan's telephone penetration rate is also relatively high, with estimates ranging from 33
(Wellenius and Stern, 1994) to 41 lines per 100 population (Chintay Shih and Yeo Lin,
1994). Taiwan's remarkable post-World War II economic growth has generated enough
revenue to invest heavily in infrastructure. In 1976 the government implemented a six-year
Telecommunication Development Plan which focused on increasing telephone density and
modernizing the sector to allow direct dial for both domestic and international calls. During
the 1980s rapidly growing international trade created a huge demand for information service,
prompting the government to designate both the information and telecommunication sectors
as strategic industries. This resulted in continued investment; for the years 1991-1996,
for example, the government called for the installation of 12 million lines of digital local
switching equipment by the end or 1996; 100 percent digitalization of toll switching lines
by 1994; construction of 23,000 kilometers of fiber-optic network; and development of ISDN
capabilities in the national network (Wellenius and Stern, 1994)
The telecommunications sector was traditionally governed as a monopoly by the Min-
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istry of Communications, which was divided into the directorate general of post (DGP) and
the directorate general of telecommunications (DGT) as soon as the MOC moved to Taipei
in 1949. The DGT has monopolized the networks and telecommunications business, as well
as drafting and executing regulations for equipment manufacturing and service provision.
Early structure of the sector arose not only out of the assumed natural monopoly condi-
tions but also because of national security concerns after World War II. Fear of invasion,
and the strategic importance of telecommunications lead naturally to a system where the
government maintained tight control of telecommunications.
Since then, liberalization of the sector has followed the same sequence as it did in the
US, UK, and Japan, with first the CPE (customer premises equipment, such as subscriber
telephone sets) market, then VAN (value added network) services, and finally common
carriers being open to competition. In fact, Taiwan's Council for Economic Planning and
Development commissioned a study in 1987 to analyze the causes and effects of reforms in
the US, UK, and Japan. The study found that primary forces behind reform were also ones
that existed in Taiwan, namely, the need for convenient and reasonably priced information
by businesses as well as the need to achieve universal service (Chintay Shih and Yeo Lin,
1994).
Development plans in the earlier years of the DGT emphasized the installation of local
telephones as a way to ease the burden of long waiting lists. Between 1965-1980 telephone
density grew annually at a rate of 18-21%. As the user base grew larger, it slowed to
7.5 percent (Tseng and Mao, 1994). During the 1980s the primary goal was to make the
transition from analog to digital switching systems; and plans have been formulated for
establishing ISDN in Taipei, Taichung, and Kaoshiung by the year 2000. As of 1990, about
two-thirds of households had telephones, with a total switching capacity of 7.84 million
lines - 20 percent digital, 24 percent electronic, and 56 percent crossbar - though all are
expected to be digital by 2000.
In addition to designating telecommunications as a strategic industry, the Taiwanese
government has promoted development of the sector by offering various financing facilities,
technological support, R&D incentive programs and assistance in product development. The
Bank of Communications plays an important role in helping many entrepreneurs during the
startup of small telecommunications and information companies, but it is legally restricted
to only 25 % of any company's equity. The Development Fund of the Executive Yuan
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was formed in 1973 to provide financial support to domestic industry and also plays an
important role in the sector.
Like Korea and China, Taiwan's sector is very limited in terms of foreign investment.
It has long been monopolized by the Directorate General of Telecommunications (DGT)
and a joint venture between the DGT and three foreign firms known as the Big Three. In
1973 ventures were established with GTE (now owned by Siemens) creating GTE Taicom
System Ltd., and with ITT Telecommunications (an ITT subsidiary now part of Alcatel)
forming ITT Taisel (Taiwan International Standard Electronic Ltd.) In 1984 these were
joined by a venture with AT&T to form AT&T Taiwan Telecommunication Co. (Business
Taiwan, Reuters, March 1, 1993; Tseng and Mao, 1994) With their market power, financial
strength, and technological advances, the Big Three form a formidable barrier to market
entry.
There has been a Telecommunications Law drafted and in place in the MOC/DGT
since 1915. The current Telecommunications Law includes a ban on foreign investment in
telecommunications services. However, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication
have proposed lifting the ban and permitting foreign investment in small-scale satellite
communications, mobile phone services, and paging services, as well as domestic value-
added networks, long-distance and international services. However, involvement would be
restricted to joint ventures with foreign capital accounting for one-third or less of the total.
In addition the chairmen, general managers, and at least half of the boards of directors and
supervisors should be Taiwanese nationals. ("Taiwan.." Business Taiwan, March 24, 1995)
Taiwan has an obvious interest in maintaining control over telecommunications as a
strategic sector, not the least because of its national security concerns. Nevertheless, the
sector is starting to open up to foreign investors, in order to fulfill the government's com-
mitments after it joins the World Trade Organization, as well as in recognition of the many
opportunities for development this represents. Though China has not had the same amount
of money available for its investment in the telecom sector that Taiwan has had, it can more
quickly take advantage of foreign investment.
Relevance to China
Unlike China, both Korea and Taiwan developed their telecommunications infrastructure
while the country was under some threat of invasion. This was a major factor in having
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a government-run monopolistic leader in the telecom sector. Furthermore, Taiwan and
Korea are significantly smaller than China, and have both experienced remarkable economic
growth. It is not clear then, that China would be better off by developing along the exact
same paths. China, it seems, does not have the same national security concerns that
Korea and Taiwan did at the time of rapid development, and thus would not be forced
into having a monopolistic operator/regulator. On the other hand, Taiwan and Korea's
"universal service" as a stated goal helped tremendously in reaching the current relatively
high telephone density. China has no such policy, and may want to consider working towards
such a goal.
Furthermore, Taiwan and Korea were both able to do without foreign investors partly
because they had a lot of financial support from the governments of countries such as
the US, again for political reasons. China not only needs significantly more money to
develop its much larger base, but it also does not have the same post-World War II money
coming; making it necessary to find other sources of funding. Currently, foreign investors
are probably the best, most available and most effective, option. Finally, Korea and Taiwan
both have a long history of telecommunications law which has made the sector easier to
understand and work in. This is something that China must work on quickly.
4.7 Foreign Entrants in the Chinese Market
4.7.1 AT&T
In February 1993, AT&T signed a comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with China's State Planning Commission. A four page document, the agreement establishes
a "long-term comprehensive partnership" between AT%T and the PRC and a commitment
to "business opportunities which they could pursue jointly." (Warwick, 1993) This agree-
ment supplanted China's Directive 56 moratorium of 1989 which declared that no new
foreign switch producers would be allowed to enter China. There were no specific terms
and conditions agreed to at the time, though ten areas of potential joint business activity
were identified: 5ESS switch manufacturing, VLSI manufacturing, network management ex-
pertise, R&D with Bell Labs, optical transmission manufacturing, wireless manufacturing,
customer premises equipment manufacturing, training, systems integration, and network
service offerings. Many of these areas also include technology transfer, joint R&D, and
74
training for Chinese nationals. China's obligations are to organize the relevant ministries -
the MPT and MEI are expected to be most active - and agencies which will then identify
the appropriate Chinese partners for cooperation with AT&T. To respond to the require-
ments of the MOU, AT&T created the China Business Unit, called AT&T China, in which
it hopes to employ mainly Chinese nationals. (Warwick, 1993)
Thus far, confirmed joint ventures between AT&T and China are ("China Industry
Overview.." EIU, May 2, 1994)
* AT&T of Beijing Fiber Optic Cable. This joint venture was formed in October 1992
with three Chinese firms, including one firm affiliated with the MPT, to manufacture
optical fiber cable.
* AT&T of Shanghai. This venture was formed in 1989 to make, sell, and service digital
transmission equipment. AT&T holds a 50% stake, 28% is held by Shanghai Opti-
cal Fiber Communications Corporation, and 22% by Shanghai Telecommunications
Equipment Factory.
* AT&T of China. This venture is with Shanghai Telecommunications Equipment Fac-
tory for manufacturing subscriber-loop carrier systems.
* AT&T Shanghai Fiber Optic Cable. A joint venture with three Chinese firms to
produce 200,000 kilometers of cable. AT&T holds 56% of the venture.
One of peculiar problems currently being faced by AT&T is its representative office
status, which precludes it from directly hiring its own local staff. Instead, it is generally
allocated Chinese workers by the local administrations, who can switch workers to jobs in
other joint ventures with little or no warning. This has lead to a series of delays. Moreover,
China has been pressing AT&T into providing the latest sub-micron integrated circuit
production technology in a proposal for a facility at Wuxi in Jiangsu province. ("China
supplier's eye-view.." EIU, May 2, 1994)
4.7.2 Other Foreign Companies
Siemens of Germany has four planned telecom joint ventures with China. These are the
Beijing International Switching Systems Corporation of which it has a 40% stake; Shanghai
Mobile Communications, to supply GSM mobile phones in Shenzhen and Shanghai; Siemens
Business Communications Systems in which it has a 51% stake; and Guangzhou Nanfang
Transmission, set up with Guangzhou Nanfang Photoelectrical Telecommunications Equip-
ment Factory. ("China Industry Overview," EIU, May 2, 1994)
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Swedish company LM Ericsson has a long history of manufacturing in China, and in
fact China is their fifth largest market. Their largest venture to date is Nanjing Ericsson
Communications, China's first mobile communications joint venture which went into service
towards the end of 1993. ("China Industry Overview")
Both LM Ericsson and Canada's Northern Telecom have expressed uncertainties over
various aspects of Chinese commercial law such as the restrictions on establishing wholly-
owned subsidiaries. These companies, as well as AT&T and others, are hoping that Chinese
commercial legislation will permit companies to have umbrella organizations which control
and coordinate subsidiary enterprises around the country. ("China Supplier's Eye-View,"
EIU, May 2, 1994)
Japanese company Fujitsu established a joint venture with Jiangsu province in November
of 1993 to produce PBX exchanges. Starting in 1995, it is expected to produce one million
circuits a year. Furthermore, Fujitsu has a licensing deal with Shanghai to manufacture
500,000 public network switches which are brought to Japan and then resold to China.
Finally, Fujitsu formed a US$9 million venture with Nanjing Telecommunications Works to
install and maintain optical telecommunications equipment. ("China Industry Overview")
Motorola is investing US$120 million in its plants to make semiconductors, mobile
phones, and pagers in Tianjin, where it expects to employ 5,000 workers by 1996. It is
a large player in China, with a turnover of US$1.4 billion in China in 1993.("China Indus-
try Overview")
Other companies which have started operating joint ventures include Alcatel, Hong
Kong's Champion Technology, and Japan's NEC.
4.7.3 US Concerns
The success of US based companies in this market will be subject to the political relation-
ship between the US and China. In particular, companies such as AT&T and Motorola
will be concerned with COCOM controls and China's Most Favored Nation status. The
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, or COCOM, was established
by NATO members (except Iceland, but also including Japan and Australia) in 1949 to
control products which members would collectively embargo to potential Communist ad-
versaries. Since the end of the Could War, access has improved a great deal, though some
of the old conservatism persists, especially in dealings with China. Traditional guidelines
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are the upper limits of permitted technology for commercial sale, though member countries
are free to put their own lower "threshold" on their exports. Thus companies must follow
certain export control guidelines in their relations with China. These are restrictions were
to have wound down by mid 1994, however, and no longer present an obstacle to technology
transfer.
In addition, Most Favored Nation (MFN) is a bilateral arrangement between the US
and China in which both countries agree to reduce or eliminate trade barriers and tariffs
on trade between them. American companies are nervous about the possibility of thus
revoking MFN, which could then significantly undermine the competitive advantage of their
products. Of course in terms of telecommunications development, it is to the advantage
of both China and these companies that MFN stay in place, though other issues such as
human rights which are beyond the scope of this thesis do provide some good reasons for
possibly revoking it.
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Chapter 5
Wireless Communications
Wireless communication technologies are China's answer to technological leapfrogging.
They have the greatest potential in mountainous and sparsely populated regions for which
laying down traditional copper cables is prohibitively expensive. Wireless communications
will definitely be part of the solution to China's telecom infrastructure development.
The wireless technologies found in China are comparable to those used in the devel-
oped world. Moreover, it is in this sector that the most innovative foreign financing and
investment deals are being made. Although both domestic and foreign efforts have thus far
been concentrated in the more prosperous coastal cities and special economic zones, newer
investors are starting to focus inland.
I will examine three types of wireless communications: cellular radio systems, paging
networks, and satellites, and analyze the role that foreign investments have and will play
in their development and adoption in different regions of the country. Finally I will ex-
amine some creative solutions that may be important for more rapid development of the
telecommunications network.
5.1 Adopting Information Technologies
Countries such as China in the Pacific Rim may be able to enter the "information society"
more quickly and efficiently than those in other regions because they are not hampered by as
many previous investments in outdated technology. To take advantage of this opportunity,
however, new communications technologies should be carefully chosen. New technologies
should be cost effective and practical, but also compatible with the needs, resources, and
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technical skills available. Furthermore it is important to ask what effect technology transfer
will have on the relationship between developed and developing country. Developed coun-
tries may assist developing countries by transfering technologies, but they may also reinforce
their own economic power or dominance by transfering only second-rate technologies.
In China's case, the primary needs are for quick diffusion of technologies that can reach
many people. Cost is an important consideration, as. is more technical training for rural
telecom workers. Foreign investors are willing to transfer the latest technologies to China
as part of their businesses, but their transactions are constrained by government rules of
both the foreign countries and Chinese. These restrictions are largely political.
5.2 Comparisons between Wireless and Wireline
In addition to being much more costly, wireline systems require a longer construction period
and more maintenance than wireless networks. Furthermore, radio systems are generally
much less susceptible to external environmental factors such as natural disasters. On the
other hand, ISDN services are currently unavailable by wireless systems although voice,
facsimile, and data communications are comparable. Therefore, for developing countries
mostly interested in increasing basic phone service access, this is not an important restric-
tion. Radio frequencies are, however, limited. This poses a definite problem once a certain
level of development has been reached and demand moves beyond capacity.
Perhaps the most relevant issue for countries such as China, though, is cost. The "Study
Committee for the Utilization of Radio Systems to Consolidate Telecommunications" un-
dertook a study on cost comparison between wireless and wireline communications systems
which was first presented to the APEC Working Group on Telecommunications in Hong
Kong in March 1994. While the study was not directly about China, their conclusions are
instructive.
This study chose to look at three separate cases, comparing traditional wireline networks
to cellular networks in a large city model, a middle-city model, and a widespread small-scale
rural area model. The model assumed only digital cellular telephones, and found the highest
cost savings in the rural area model, which was basically a 500 subscriber network scattered
around 2300km2. It found that the cost per subscriber was around one third that of the
wireline network; and if the cost of mobile switching was not included (since one mobile
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switching center can support more than the rural-area networks), the cost per subscriber
fell to nearly one-sixth.(Saga, Aug. 1994) The large-city model found the cost of wireline
to be about twice as much as for the wireless system. For the middle-city model, however
(15,000 subscriber network spread over 60km2 ), wireless was found to actually cost more
unless the mobile switching units were not included.(Saga, Aug. 1994)
While it is not clear that the assumptions are completely valid for Chinese cities, it is
interesting to note that the present technology diffusion trend from large cities to mid-sized
cities to small cities to rural areas may not be the wisest. Instead, attention should be given
to remote and rural areas in terms of wireless telephony. 1
Because of the high initial costs of cellular networks, most networks thus far tend to
have small capacities and high subscription rates, with the number of subscribers usually
limited to 500-1000 stations. (Zheng, 1991) Also because of limitations in network capacity
and investment, networks in the initial period are mostly structured on the basis of large
radio coverage areas of omnidirectional operation.
In China, cellular operators pay on average $1,000 - $3000 per customer as compared
with the $2,000-$5000 that P&T's typically pay for each conventional phone line. Because
of the initial fee (on average $3600- $4,500) as well as monthly subscription fees ($27),
cellular services generate a revenue for the local P&T. Connection charges are much lower
for standard service, ranging from $80-$600. (1993 averages. Gorham and Chadran, 1993)
Hence, cellular services are more profitable and cheaper to the supplier, but also thus far
less accessible to poorer users.
5.3 Mobile Communications Technologies
5.3.1 China's Cellular Network
While the MPT in Beijing is working to develop the wireline infrastructure in China, the
provincial P&Ts have taken the lead in promoting wireless communications. MPT maintains
control over radio frequencies used by the telecom providers, but the local P&Ts enjoy
a great deal of freedom in planning, financing, implementing and operating the mobile
networks. Since November 1987 when Ericsson's TACS (Total Area Coverage System) 900
MHz mobile telephone systems were first installed in Guangzhou, the number of mobile
'I was not able to find this report to find out what all of the assumptions of their model were.
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cellular telephones has been growing at an annual rate of over 220 percent. By the end
of 1994 China had as many as 1.5 million mobile cellular telephone subscribers, a third of
whom are in Guangdong province. (China Telecom Newsletter, January 1995) Also among
the top six provinces in terms of number of subscribers are Liaoning, Fujian, Zhejiang,
Jiangsu, and Hunan.(Du, Feb 1995)
The adoption of mobile phone services has followed patterns of economic growth, with
Beijing, Tianjin, Tangshan, the Yangtze Delta and the Pearl River Delta adopting the
technologies first. ("Fast Movers," May 1993) Provincial authorities continue to maintain
control over the operation of these networks, but have turned to foreign companies for
supplying phones, base stations, cellular switching technology, and technical expertise.
A current national plan to connect major cities by fiber optic trunk lines also proposes
the linking of remote regions by cellular networks. While fiber optics will be installed along
the Beijing-Shanghai-Guangzhou, Harbin- Beijing-Haikou, Beijing-Xian-Chengdu, Beijing-
Lanzhou-Urumuqi, and Shanghai- Chengdu lines, contracts for cellular interconnections are
being awarded to or under negotiation with oversees companies. Motorola, for instance, is
currently installing a cellular network in Tibet. (Weiss and Wong, 1994)
The National Radio Management Commission, together with the MPT, have reserved
the 900 MHz frequency for urban cellular applications, 450MHz for dedicated networks and
some remote areas, and the 150MHz band for all paging networks. Furthermore, the coastal
public networks operate at 900 MHz TACS. (Gorham and Chadran, "Communicating")
However, these standards are not always observed, and some areas have adopted different
standards.
Thus far Ericsson and Motorola have been the main players in this market. Ericsson
has a cellular equipment joint venture with the Nanjing Radio Factory, which is affiliated
with the MMEI (Ministry of Machinery and Electronics Industry) and in 1993 claimed to
have installed roughly 60 percent of China's total cellular capacity. Motorola, on the other
hand, began working in 1991 with the MPT's Hangzhou Telecommunications Equipment
Factor to produce cellular handsets, base systems, and switching equipment.
Both of these providers have concentrated on analog technology, with the European
TACs and American AMPs. In fact, the adoption of these two incompatible standards
delayed the introduction of a roaming system. China is likely to continue operating on
multiple standards and frequencies for some time, as vendors may find themselves locked into
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certain markets for the next 5-10 years because entry into markets with different standards
is very difficult. (Gorham and Chadran, "Communicating..") However, bandwidth and
service quality considerations are prompting a move towards digital cellular networks using
either CDMA or GSM transmission standards.
5.3.2 Cellular Radio Telephony
Cellular mobile phone service usually uses a 50 MHz band within the 800-900 MHz radio
band to create 832 two way radio channels. The frequency band from 824 to 849 MHz is
used to receive signals from the mobile units, and the band from 869 to 894 MHz to transmit
the signals. The channels can be reused within the same geographic area, increasing the
number of customers which can be served. This is accomplished by using a number of
low-power radio transmitters each of which services a smaller cell, typically with a radius of
six to twelve miles. Each cell area has a base station with radio transceivers and a certain
number of radio channels. The low power of the transmitters allow the same channel to
be used again in another (non-adjacent) part of the region; cell configuration is chosen to
minimize interference caused by reuse of the channel. If congestion appears on the system,
cells can be further split into smaller cells by using even lower powered transmitters.
Because mobility is a key feature of this service, it is necessary to track users as they move
from cell to cell. Cells are organized into clusters which are repeated over the geographic
area. (See Figure 5-1) (Noll, 1991) Base stations in the cells are connected by fixed links
to dedicated telephone exchanges called mobile switching centers (MSCs) which interface
with the public switched telephone network, carry out call accounting, and manage roaming
between cells.
When a user does move from one cell to another, the process of changing the channel
used to transmit to and receive from the base stations is know as a handoff. The system
continually monitors the strength of the signal from the mobile unit so that when it falls
below a certain threshold the call is transferred to a channel in the next cell. This process
should be transparent to the user, though if there are no free channels in the new cell, the
call could be cut off.
Roaming, or the capability to use cellular phones outside the home service area, is accom-
plished through agreements between service providers in the different locations. Roaming
customers are billed through their home service provider rather than getting separate bills
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Cells are organized into clusters, with most cellular systems using seven cells per cluster. The
radio channels are allocated across the seven cells. The clusters are then repeated over and
over again to cover the whole geographic area served by the system. Since cells using the
same channels are separated from each other, and also since the radio power is low, inter.
ference is less likely. Although the cells are depicted as hexagons, their actual shape is quite
irregular and depends on the terrain and radio propagation.
Figure 5-1: Cellular Telephony
from each. In the US, Canada, and Europe, the IS-41A standard, which includes automatic
intersystem roaming and call delivery, has been adopted to create a seamless network. (Ve-
lasquez, April 1994)
Roaming is possible in China with the new network activated on January 1, 1995. The
world's largest TACs 900 Mhz cellular mobile roaming network, it covers fifteen provinces
and municipalities using Ericsson systems and 21 provinces and municipalities using Mo-
torola systems. (China Telecom Newsletter, Jan. 1995)(see map 5-3)
5.3.3 Chinese Mobile Standards
In 1992 the MPT released frequency allocation standards for mobile communications as
follows (Zhang Nong, 1994):
Up Link: 890MHz-915 MHz, in which
890MHz - 905 MHz, analog
905 MHz - 915 MHz, digital
Down Link 935Mz- 960 Mhz, in which
935 MHz - 950 MHz, analog
950 MHz - 960 MHz, digital
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5.3.4 Digital Mobile Service
Choosing a Digital Technology
Demand for cellular mobile phone service has grown at such an fast rate that many local-
ities are shortening their base station radii and are continually searching for ways to more
efficiently utilize radio spectrum. For instance whereas most cells are macrocells with a
coverage radius of 20 km, or up to 40 km for hill-top stations, radio coverage in Guangdong
has gone as low as a km radius. Microcells are also coming to several other cities such as
Shenzhen. (Zhang Nong, 1994) Such problems have naturally lead to the consideration of
ways to deal with future traffic growth.
One possible way of increasing the number of channels is to use non-formal channel
allocation. Rather than dividing the channels evenly into groups, this scheme would allocate
the groups unevenly based on amount of traffic; with groups of less channels reserved for
light traffic areas in between macro cells and micro-cells. However, having both macro- and
micro-cells in the same system may add confusion to a chaotic system; and the attainable
increase in number of channels is not that great. (Zhang Nong, 1994)
A better option for providing increasing system capacity is the adoption of digital mobile
systems. Because the choice of a communications systems can have a definite impact on
a country's social and political environment; and because it is more difficult to change
technologies once one has been adopted, especially in a country as large as China, there has
been a lot of heated debate about which digital standard China should adopt.(CTC Forum,
4/94) The ITU (International Telecommunications Union) recommended a choice among:
D-AMPS (TDMA) used in North America; GSM in Europe; PDC in Japan; and N-CDMA
(narrow-band CDMA) used also in North America.
Time Division Multiplexing
In time division multiple access (TDMA), pulses from different sources are interleaved into
designated time slots of the same transmission channel. TDMA keeps the same framework
and design as today's analog cellular network but provides three times the capacity. Both
the US and European standards are a TDMA specification; and it is considered a tested
and proven technology.
85
KEY
BSC-Base Stabon
Controller
MSC-Motxb System
Controller
8TS -Base Stwon
Transceiver
Systems
MS - Moile
Systems
VLR-Visdtor Location
Register
HLR -Home Location
Register
Figure 5-2: GSM
GSM
Originally named after the Group Speciale Mobile, GSM was designed to provide pan-
European roaming so that subscribers could use their equipment anywhere in Europe. The
structure of the fixed network in GSM is similar to that of analog cellular radio, but GSM has
improved capacity, frequency hopping, more efficient use of the spectrum, and better digital
speech quality. The transmit frequency of GSM's base station is 935-960 MHz, frequency of
the mobile station is 890-915 MHz, the duplex separation is 45 MHz and carrier separation is
200 Khz. Its multi-access mode is created a mixture of FDMA (frequency division multiple
access) and TDMA (time division multiple access). (Zhang Nanruo, 1994) A typical GSM
system is shown in Figure 5-2. (Datapro) Transmission and reception times in GSM are
separated by a time shift of three slots rather than working simultaneously. (ivett, Feb.
1993)
Allocation of the frequencies designated for use by the digital cellular system is required
for a license to operate GSM. In some countries however, these frequency bands have been
divided to accommodate more than one operator. In general, GSM adopting countries have
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been those whose analog systems are already too congested; those which have space on
analog but are rolling out GSM to meet particular MOU requirements; and those which
currently have enough analog bandwidth but will run out in the future. (Trivett, Feb. 1993)
In China, the primary impetus for change is recognized inadequacies of the TDMA
TACS system adopted in the late 1980s. In particular, network capacity is limited by low
usage of the radio frequency spectrum; problems in making the transition to future ISDN;
and the lack of standardization in analog mobile systems which would facilitate automatic
international roaming.
China is now one of the world's fastest growing cellular phone markets and provides
the greatest potential for GSM outside of Europe. GSM is operating under a trial basis
in Guangdong in a system supplied by Northern Telecom to the Guangdong Mobile Com-
munications Corporation (GMCC) under an October 1993 contract. (Pyramid Research,
April 1994) GMCC, which is affiliated with the Guangdong P&T and is the largest mobile
network operator in China, is moving at a rapid pace towards digital cellular, with NT,
Ericsson, Alcatel, and AT&T all supplying it with GSM equipment. This network will
provide services to Huizhou, Hudong, Huiyang, Dayabay, and Bouluo. (Trivett, "GSM"
1994) Siemens also cut over a trial GSM network in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in
April 1994 (Pyramid Research, April 1994) The first commercial GSM system in China was
launched in Jiaxing, near Shanghai, the infrastructure for which was provided by Alcatel.
(Trivett, "GSM" 1994)
CDMA
CDMA (code division multiple access) is an application of spectrum spreading modulation
technology in a multi-access system. The voice signal is transmitted in bursts at low power
over a wider bandwidth while the receiver listens for a specific code sequence to find the
intended signal. Its forward signal uses the band 869-894 MHz and the backward signal uses
824-849 MHz.Unlike in time or frequency division multiplexing, the spectrum can be reused
without interference because other signals appear to be random noise. The bandwidth
of the transmit signal is relatively wide and not relevant to the bandwidth of the message
signal. The phone receiver listens only to those signals whose first bits have the specific code
sequence that it is programmed to select, thus giving CDMA much greater noise immunity
and better quality or reception over other signal transmission technologies. CMDA allows
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for a better frequency reuse over short distances, which is particularly appealing when there
is a lack of radio spectrum available. It is a very useful technique for accommodating more
users in an area with high population density to use the same frequencies without interfering
with each other. A comparison of spectral performances is as shown (Zhang Nanruo, 1994):
Table 5.1: Capacity Comparisons
TACs GSM CDMA
Channel frequency bandwidth 25KHz 200 KHz 1.25 MHz
Voice channel number 200 200 240
Times of frequency reuse 7 4 1
Channels per base station 28 50 240
Subscribers per base station 1010 2015 11295
Both Ji Tong and Shenzhen Telephone Company have selected US company InterDigital
Communications Corporation's Broadband-Code Division Multiple Access (B-CDMA). Ji
Tong is using it to operate a high-speed wireless network in Beijing with a total capacity of
15,000 - 18,000 subscribers for each of 17 base stations. Full wireless service is due to start
in 1995-96 and the network is slated to be fully operational by 1997. The Shenzhen system
should have a capacity of 100,000 subscribers, with the base stations delivered through its
Hong Kong partner Tele-Art Ltd in the 1995-1997 time frame. (Pyramid Research, April
1994)
5.3.5 CDMA vs GSM
Whereas GSM is already commercial in several places and can realize roaming, CDMA is
still in its experimental stage. On the other hand, there seems to be support from within the
MPT to adopt CDMA rather than GSM. Some of the reasons given are questionable: "GSM
harms people's health, because its radiation power of pulse peak is large," (Huang San Rong,
1994) but on the other hand CDMA has a capacity as many as five times that capable with
a GSM system, which is important given China's quickly growing demand. CDMA also
has the advantage of a soft handover (the several hundred millisecond interruption during
a handoff characteristic of GSM does not occur). In general, CDMA looks more promising,
88
in theory at least, than GSM as a way of meeting China's specific mobile communications
needs. However, GSM made an earlier headway into the market and seems to be entrenching
itself in the sector.
5.3.6 Heilongjiang Province
As with other parts of China, waiting lists for telephone installation in Heilongjiang province
are very long as the Heilongjiang Posts & Telecommunications Administration continues
to be unable to meet local demand. In Harbin, registration fees were already US$464
in July 1994, with the time between registration and actual installation more than six
months. To encourage demand for cellular services as a substitute for wireline, the HPTA
cut its registration fees in 1994 from US$1,161 to US$581, with some areas of lower demand
charging fees as low as US$290. Monthly fees went from US$17.42 to US$5.81, and airtime
fees were down to US$0.05 per minute. These prices are significantly lower than those
charged in the more economically prosperous coastal provinces where the different market
supports connection fees of US$2,323 to US$3,484.("Heilongjiang..", Pyramid Research,
July 1994) These cuts were possible primarily because Heilongjiang has yet to experience the
explosive growth in economy and prices that has been experienced by the coastal regions.
However, the HPTA is also hoping that the low cost will greatly stimulate demand for
cellular services to make up for any difference.
HPTA's first cellular network was installed in Harbin in 1991. By 1994 the Motorola
900 MHz AMPS system covered 13 cities and 68 counties. Also by 1994, total province-
wide numbers were 30,000 subscribers, or half of total capacity. A second "B" system, a
small TACS LM Ericsson-provided network, was introduced in June 1994 has taken care
of Harbin's excess cellular demand. Currently there are 7000 subscribers but the HPTA is
reportedly negotiating a major expansion to 200,000 subscribers by the end of 1995. ("Hei-
longjiang..", Pyramid Research, July 1994) With both Motorola and Ericsson networks,
Heilongjiang is able to take advantage of the recently activated national roaming network.
5.3.7 Guangdong Province
The country's leader in telecom development, Guangdong's mobile phone use currently
accounts for about 35% of the country's total. The number of cellular phone holders has
grown at an average annual rate of 166.2% per year over the past seven years. The older
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analog network which covers almost all cities and towns in the province reach more than
517,000 customers, while the new digital mobile service that was completed in October, 1994
is aimed to reach 450,000 users covering the Pearl River region from the east to the west
of Guangdong, mail roads, and part of the mountainous regions. According to Lu Errui,
director of Guangdong's Mobile Communications Bureau, "we are actively cooperating with
foreign telecom giants to expand this service." (Li, Feb. 1995.)
5.4 "Wireless Loop"
One promising development for rural and remote communities is known as the "wireless
loop." This is basically a cellular system, but without advanced features or full capacity.
Thus the switch portion is significantly reduced, saving both investment costs and instal-
lation time. Because the wireless loop can support 24- and 30-channel telecommunication
formats, it can exist alongside existing telephone networks. More importantly, however, it
has the potential to extend phone service access to many individuals who currently do not
have it.
Small wireless loop systems generally have a subscriber base of 300-5000 customers,
within a radius of about 40 kilometers from the base station coverage area. Since deployment
costs are not distance-dependent, costs per channel is usually between US$300 - US$1000
per subscriber (Favre, April 1994), as compared to US$2000 - US $5000 for landline systems
and US$1000 - $3000 for conventional cellular systems.(Gorham and Chadran, 1993) Unlike
landline systems which take a minimum of 1-2 years to install, wireless loop providers can
provide service within a few months. Service is easily extended and investment thus less
risky.
Currently a few remote locations in China, as well as in the Marshall Islands and Russia,
are using wireless loop, according to Shue Kwan, Wireless Subscriber System product man-
ager, AT&T Network Systems. (Favre, April 1994) In addition, India is currently conduct-
ing field trials of both CDMA and CT2 wireless local loop technologies in Delhi, Bombay,
Calcutta, Hyderabad and Madurai. Motorola and other prospective service providers are
awaiting the results of these trials as they propose joint ventures. For example, Motorola
together with Usha Martin Industries hopes to set up a rural network in the tea garden
areas of West Bengal. Cost estimates in this region are $500 per subscriber compared with
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$500 in urban areas for wired loops and $1500-$2000 in rural areas.(Pyramid Research Asia,
Sept. 1994)
In China, this technology has far greater potential than it has currently reached, largely
because emphasis prior to now has been on densely populated coastal regions. As attention
shifts to the Chinese interior, we should be seeing more need for wireless loops.
5.5 Paging Networks
Paging has long been successful in China, not only because of the long wait lists for telephone
installation, but also because the main alternative, cellular telephones, cost anywhere from
US $1,150 to $ 1,750 (10,000 - 15,000 yuan) to purchase and register, more than ten times the
cost of a pager. As a result, paging networks have also taken off in China, with an expansion
from around 430,000 subscribers in 200 cities in 1990, to over one million subscribers in 400
cities in 1991, to over 5.61 million by the end of 1993. (Bien and Pham, 1994)
This technology was given an extra boost when the market was officially opened in late
1993 to organizations not affiliated with the MPT. Though this helped fuel growth, paging
networks had in fact already long been leased to the public by private (non-PTT) operators
through informal channels. (Pyramid Research, Aug. 1994) According to some sources,
however, private operators are still granted licenses only for "special purpose" rather than
commercial use, though excess capacity from these networks can be sold to the general
public. (Pyramid Research, Aug. 1994)
As with other communication technologies, foreign companies are prohibited from par-
ticipating the operation of paging networks. However, this is perhaps the most "exceptional"
of technologies, or the one where it is the easiest to stretch the literal interpretations of this
policy. For instance, there seem to be many Hong Kong companies participating in network
operation through joint ventures and "consultancy" arrangements. In fact, Beijing's Capi-
tal News Communications paging network lists a Hong Kong joint venture as an operating
partner, despite the MPT's policy.
5.5.1 Competition in Beijing
With a telephone waiting list of more than 50,000, Beijing has been a natural place for
paging networks to take off. Although the price of a pager still limits customers to mainly
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work units, or "danwei" rather than individuals, there are already more paging subscribers
(800,000) than main lines in the city.
Approximately 30% of Beijing's paging subscribers use the Beijing Telecommunications
Administration's (BTA) networks. The first organization to operate a paging network in
China, the BTA has a significant cost advantage over its private competitors since it does
not have to pay licensing or network interconnection fees. Roaming has been implemented
with other PTA networks in Beijing, Tianjin, and Tanggu. While some of their networks
are operated solely by the BTA, others are operated in partnership with the military or
other organizations.
Despite its early start, the BTA is now being overwhelmed by the number of alternatives
springing up. Most such non-BTA network operators are quite small and serve only several
hundred subscribers; they include the Ministry of Railways, State Planning Commission,
Air Force, Chinese Communist Party School, Chinese Navy, Beijing City Power Supply
Bureau, National Tourism Ministry, and several Beijing district governments. (Pyramid
Research, August 1994) Some of the companies share frequencies to help defray the US
$23,250 (200,000 yuan) frequency usage fee charged by the BTA. The monthly leasing fee
for a trunk line also increased from US $19 in 1993 to US $349 in 1994, though there are
reports that some companies favored by the BTA still pay lower fees.
Among the most prominent non-BTA paging operators in Beijing currently are HuaXun
Corporation, CATCH Corporation, and GuoAn Communications Company. The largest,
HuaXun, operated around 30 networks in the area by August 1994, and had enough capacity
to support more than 100,000 additional subscribers. The president of HuaXun was former
director of the frequency-distributing Beijing Wireless Management Committee, giving the
company political clout and eventually, the largest slice of non-MPT paging frequency in
Beijing. It's 1993 revenues alone were nearly US $3.5 million. In addition to paging, HuaXun
is also building a mobile communications network for. the State Council and Beijing City
Government, and manages a 800 MHz mobile system in the city.
Like HuaXun, CATCH has not been limited to network operation. In addition to running
twelve paging networks in Beijing, CATCH is an investor in Lian Tong and signed up an
agreement to set up Lian Tong's Beijing office, as well as operating 450MHz and 800 MHz
trunked mobile networks around China. It's alliance with Lian Tong will likely help it break
into the cellular network area; and its support from the Beijing Municipal Government has
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allowed CATCH to connect paging networks in Beijing to the Shanghai stock exchange.
(Pyramid Research, August 1994)
Finally, the GuoAn Communications Company, subsidiary of China International Trust
and Investment Corporation (CITIC), runs four Beijing paging networks: Zhong Xin,
RuiXin, HuaYing, and FengYun. The latter two are both operating at about 50% capacity
and are interconnected to the national network.
5.5.2 Heilongjiang
Paging has become very popular in Heilongjiang province as a "virtual phone service" for
the same reasons as it has in other parts of China - long wait times for fixed line installation,
and very high prices of cellular phones. In addition to basic paging, the Heilongjiang Posts
& Telecommunications Administration (HPTA) plans to start offering value-added services
such as voice-mail.
The growth of the paging market here has been similar to, though on a smaller scale
than in Beijing. When the MPT officially opened paging services operation to non-MPT or-
ganizations in late 1993, the HPTA's (Heilongjiang Posts & Telecommunications) monopoly
was ended. However, it retains a great deal of clout as the provincial PTAs were allowed to
retain final approval over which organizations are allowed to operate the networks. Foreign
operators are, of course, still banned. Growth of privately-operated networks has been so
fast that some of the 30 available frequencies in the allotted 100 MHz band are already
shared by more than one operator. Many observers feel that some of the smaller networks
will not survive as competition grows.
Interconnection is an important goal. Currently existing paging networks cover virtually
the entire province, but many systems are antiquated and cannot be interconnected. HPTA
signed a contract with American supplier Glenayre to replace some of these systems with
new internetworked paging systems in fourteen cities. Privately-operated paging networks
are also allowed to interconnect with HPTA networks.
5.5.3 Champion Technology
Claiming more than 60% of the Chinese language pager market, Champion Technology is
an interesting success story in the pager market. Unlike larger firms such as Motorola or
Matsushita which tend to sell large volumes of low profit margin equipment, Champion sells
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its products along with software, training, and technical assistance. As a result, Champion
can gain margins as high as 50% from service fees. This is useful also to the customer who
wants the technical support. ("Champion," Jan. 1994)
Champion's success has been due largely to the entrepreneurial efforts of its founder and
chairman, Paul Kan. Kan has used his Chinese ethnicity to develop political connections,
including Wan Li, veteran Communist Party leader and supporter of Deng Xiaoping. In
fact, Wan recently invited Kan to suggest ways to liberalize China's telecommunications
industry. ("Champion," Jan. 1994) In addition, Kan reportedly has strong links to both the
PLA and public security organs which have a hand in radio frequency spectrum allocation.
The liberalization of China's telecom market certainly has not done away with the need for
guan xi in getting things accomplished.
Despite these strong ties, Champion ran into some controversy recently when news
reports suggested that it had become the first foreign owner and operator of paging networks
in China. Champion executives insisted that it is their partners, the local government
organizations, that actually operate the networks.("Champion," Jan. 1994)
5.5.4 Future prospects
Demand for pagers is expected to keep rising in the near future. However, as paging fre-
quency bands become clogged by small networks, larger networks may buy them up, or
their allocated frequencies may be returned to local PTAs. Motorola and other manufac-
turers basically hope that Chinese incomes continue to rise and that paging prices will drop
enough for the boom to continue. Interconnection problems will also become more impor-
tant in the future. There may be a few opportunities soon for indirect investment in paging
networks through joint venture or private companies, but for equipment manufacturing will
remain the predominant channel through which foreign companies can become involved.
("Liberalization.." Pyramid Research, August 1994)
5.6 Satellites
5.6.1 Satellite Technology
Satellite communication systems are comprised of the space segment, the signal element,
and the ground segment. A signal is transmitted from the ground to the satellite where it
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is received, amplified, converted, and retransmitted by transponders to one or more earth
stations. A typical satellite transponder offers 36 MHz of bandwidth at frequencies from
4GHz to 6GHz. A typical communications satellite carries 12 or 24 transponders for a
total bandwidth of 432 MHz or 864 MHz. All satellite circuits now operate in one of two
frequency bands: the C-band, with uplinks in the 6 GHz range and downlinks in the 4 GHz
range, and the Ku-band with uplinks in the 14 GHz range and downlinks in the 12 GHz
range. (Anderson, 1994)
As satellite technology has progressed, earth stations have become smaller and smaller,
greatly reducing costs. Earth stations have both transmit and receive capabilities, including
access to the satellite and ground environment, multiplexing, modulation, amplification,
signal processing, and frequency conversion. There are basically four major types of earth
stations available in the fixed services satellite band: complex high-capacity type earth
stations, midcapacity satellite earth.stations, VSATs (very small aperture terminals, often
4-5 m in diameter), and receive-only earth stations. VSAT networks often consist of one
master earth stations (MES) and up to a thousand VSAT terminals sharing the same
MES. The VSATs can communicate with each other through the MES in a star network,
requiring a double satellite hop. This gives the VSAT network an economic advantage over
a terrestrial network with links between each location. In addition, VSATs are easier to
install and maintain than high-capacity types. (Anderson, 1994)
5.6.2 Satellites and Development
Satellites have dramatically reduced the costs of providing both two-way basic commu-
nications and broadcasting services to small and scattered communities. They are most
often used to transmit national radio and television networks; but two-way services are also
readily available. Despite the great promise that these services have towards development,
however, the benefits of satellite technology for telecommunications has often gone largely
unrealized.
Cost is the largest obstacle. Even though it is far less expensive to use satellites to reach
remote areas than to lay down copper wire, the initial capital investment of over $200 million
for the satellite, launch, insurance, and master control station is prohibitive. The total price
is even higher when the necessary earth stations are considered. At present, China and India
are the only developing countries capable of building their own communications satellites
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rather than relying on foreign suppliers,though they too relied on foreign-built satellites
(Intelsat for China) for their first systems.
Another problem is the limited life span (ten years) for most satellites, and the "last
mile" work that must be done to make full use of them. For example, local telephone
facilities have to be installed or upgraded so that links to the earth station are reliable in
order for satellites to be effective. Finally, satellites are most often used for broadcasting,
but it should be remembered that for isolated groups of people, two-way communications
is an even greater need.
5.6.3 China's use of satellites
Despite these difficulties, China has made great progress with satellite technology. In fact,
it has been estimated that the use of satellite technology in China for both one- and two-
way communications has saved China 10-20 years in "economic take-off." (Hong, Junhao,
1995) The era of satellite communications began for China in 1972 with the visits of for-
mer US president Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan. Since then, both
international and domestic use has grown rapidly. (Yan, Zhigang, Jin, 1993)
Satellites used by China are in the Clarke Orbit above the Indian and Pacific Oceans
and are owned by one of three organizations: the International Telecommunications Satel-
lite Organization (INTELSAT), the MPT, and a regionally-based company, Asia Satellite
Telecommunications Co. (Asiasat). Earth stations for international service are Standard-
A (STD-A) type, with antennae diameters of 20m, 30m, and 32m while domestic service
stations are 6m, 13m, and 16m. There are now five STD-A earth stations, three in Beijing
and two in Shanghai. The satellites accessed by Beijing are at IOR60oE (60 degrees east
longitude in the Indian Ocean Region), IOR63oE and POR174oE (Pacific Ocean Region).
More than 5000 toll trunk lines operate over INTELSAT satellites, with direct access to 48
regions and countries and transit access to over 180. (Shen, 1993)
Thus far all of China's domestic communications satellite have used the C-band. This
includes five developed by the Chinese Academy of Space Technology as well as six transpon-
ders leased from Asiasat and five leased from INTELSAT. Most of the trunks use FDMA
and SCPC (single channel per carrier), though TDMA has been field trialed as well. The
MPT plans to use an intermediate data rate digital satellite transmission system for the
domestic public network with digital circuit multiplication equipment (DCME) to increase
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the number of telephone circuits by factors of four to eight. (Yan, Zhigang, and Jin, 1993).
Developing satellites to use the Ku band as well will help create conditions for broader
usage.
The fastest growing use of satellites, however, is of VSATs, also known as micro earths
stations. VSATs are attractive in that the service provider can guarantee fixed costs, they
are flexible in capacity, each to configure (adding and changing sites), and have high network
quality. VSAT operators generally control costs by either owning the network or obtaining
long term leases rather than paying telephone company charges. In this way, one-way
point to multipoint networks save about 50 percent over landline costs whereas two-way
interactive networks have savings of about 30 percent.(Hudson, 1990)
In China most VSAT networks are star configured, with the hub located in a political
or economic center - either a capital city, provincial center, or near the headquarters of
some ministries or large companies. Because there is no direct link between two small
stations, there is a large time delay in communications between two such places. For voice
communications, the calling party would be able to hear the response of the called party
only after almost a second. Some small stations such as Hughes' TES VSAT system now
have direct circuits between two small stations, but these are constrained by the size of the
small station antenna and transponder power of the satellite. (Gong Bin, 1994) Switching
over to mesh configurations would alleviate the problem somewhat.
The number of VSATs currently installed and working in public and private networks
exceeds 10,000. (Shimi, 1994) The 1993 State Council directive that officially opened VSAT
operation to non-MPT organizations has spurred on this growth, which will soon lead China
into being Asia's largest market for VSAT networks. Now, non-MPT organizations such
as China Investments and Trust Corporation (CITIC), Guangzhou Satellite, Guangzhou
Tesonics, and Shanghai State either build large networks or purchase high-capacity hubs to
sell to secondary users.(Pyramid Research, Oct. 1994) Although MPT and other agencies
have gone out of their way to stress cooperation with foreign companies, the terms of
relationship are constrained and foreign ownership or operation will not be allowed in the
near future.
There is, however, still no firm policy about whether domestic VSAT services might be
able to use foreign satellites to carry signals. According to Mr. Zhang Renqi of the State
Planning Commissions, China does not have sufficient satellite capacity yet, but "at the
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moment, we do not have specific regulations, but in a long term perspective, we advocate
the use of Chinese satellites." (China Telecom Update, CSIS, 1994)
The issue of foreign ownership and operation is particularly sticky and undefined in the
area of international satellites. Mr. Liu Cai, director of the Department of Law and Policy
(DPL) of MPT stated at a conference that foreign investment in satellite systems such as
Apstar is consistent with the ban on foreign service providers because "Apstar and Intelsat
are considered international satellites; they cannot serve the country without permission
from the government, but capacity can be leased from them if China needs it," suggesting
that the "fixed lease" option is the "exception" foreign service providers should look towards
for entering the satellite market. When asked about leasing on negotiated terms, Liu stated,
"clever people can do that without breaking the law," implying that the terms of such
a lease should not be linked the results of the operation of the system.(China Telecom
Update, CSIS, 1994) Finally, asked in this context about how China defines "operation," Liu
answered that profit-sharing, and "those who get paid based on their share in a property are
considered to be participating in a joint operation." Like radio communications, satellites
offer a much more flexible "in" to the telecom sector. (Li, Feb. 1995.)
5.6.4 Private Networks
Private, or special-use VSAT networks are owned primarily by government ministries, but
also by financial institutions, news gathering agencies, and other such groups. Among
the ministries which operate VSATs are the Ministry of Petroleum and Gas (MPG), and
the Ministries of Aerospace Industries, Coal, Mining, and Water Resources. The PLA
reportedly operates a VSAT in a remote province as well. (Pyramid Research, October
1994) Furthermore, VSI's V-net system and Israel's GILAT have both been imported by
CHINASAT for providing data communications to banks, news agencies, civil aviation
administrations, as well as securities and future markets including Shenzhen Securities,
Shanghai Cereals, and Beijing Commodities. (Shimi, 1994)
The largest VSAT network in China is, however, operated by the People's Bank of
China, which has VSATs located in cities within each of China's provinces. It is currently
issuing a tender for major network expansion. Among the bidders are Hughes, IBM, and
a consortium of AT&T, China Tongda Network Systems, and China Software Technology
Service Co. (Pyramid Research, October 1994)
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The formation of Lian Tong and Ji Tong will probably lead the MOR and MPI to connect
their networks in the future. If other VSAT operators decide to interconnect their networks
as well, the resulting networks may be able to offer long distance service throughout China.
Hughes is the definitive market leader in the VSAT area, with more than 2000 VSATs
in more than thirty networks. It has moved further into the market with a joint venture in
May 1993 to produce its Telephony Earth Station (TES) and Personal Earth Station (PES)
models. It owns a 51% stake while other partners including the MPT's First Research
Institute share the rest. Thus far foreign suppliers such as Hughes, AT&T Tridom, NEC,
and GTE have supplied only to private or special-use networks.
5.6.5 VSATs in the public network
Perhaps the most interesting use of VSATs is to substitute or complement wireline systems
in the more remote or mountainous regions. For example, in 1992 the Posts & Telecom-
munications Administration of Tibet started linking locales to the PSTN (public switched
telephone network) using Hughes TES (Telephony Earth Station), a model used for voice
traffic. By early 1994, 38 of Tibet's counties had TES, which supported 500 communica-
tions lines and allowed access to domestic and international direct dialing services for the
first time. (Pyramid Research, Sept 1994) The mesh network of VSATs uses digital SCPC
(single channel per carrier), at 2600 Hz and a transmission speed of 32 Kbps. (Yu, 1992)
Similarly, the "5 Provinces" VSAT project provides voice connections to the PSTN
via 700 voice channels in Yunnan, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Guizhou, and Qinghai. This
38-VSAT network is being financed and operated by the PTAs of these five more underde-
veloped regions. Hughes is also supplying TES VSATs for this network.
In China's economically stagnant northwestern provinces of Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia,
Qinghai, and Xinjiang, the introduction of satellite telecommunications has made possi-
ble economic cooperation between the provinces and foreign countries. Tibet also recently
opened its first stock trading center which is linked by satellite to China's two stock ex-
changes in Shanghai and Shenzhen.(Hong, 1995)
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Figure 5-3: National Mobile Cellular Roaming
(China Telecom Newsletter, January 1995)
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Limitations
The general opacity of policy-making in China makes a study such as this both difficult
and necessary. According to Milton Mueller, "In China's social system, it is very difficult
for critical analysis of policy options and industry models to seep into public discourse,
particularly when foreigners are involved." (Mueller, 1994) Underlying my thesis has been
the understanding that policy cannot simply be reduced to technology, and that economic,
political, social and other forces also shape policy decisions in what appears to be a tech-
nological question or effort.
Unfortunately, in China official publications for foreigners are carefully restricted to
describing what technologies have been deployed, what the targets are, and how they are
being met. Moreover, foreign companies who do find their "in" to the country have an
interest in maintaining their advantage and are obviously reluctant to part with informa-
tion or experiences in their work. This is especially true of telecommunications because
of its sensitive nature to the Chinese government, and because of the newness of foreign
involvement. Thus, this thesis has been limited more than anything else by the kinds of
information I could find and the kinds of questions I was able to ask.
6.2 Summary
Policy-making in the Chinese telecommunications sector can best be understood as the
outcome of continually shifting relationships among various bureaucracies: the MPT and
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the MEI; the PLA and the various ministries; the MPT, local governments, and local P&Ts,
the MPT and the State Council. Each of the organizations has a definite stake in the
telecommunications sector. The MPT is struggling to maintain control over its traditional
monopoly, the State Council wants to modernize the country as quickly as possible, and
the local P&T enterprises are eager to exercise their recently gained autonomy in network
planning and financing. Hence, policy decisions are attributable neither exclusively to power
struggles among individuals or factions; nor exclusively to rational evaluation of the best
interests of the country. Of course, the power of the top leaders is evident. Vice Premier
Zou Jiahua, for example, has had considerable influence in getting Lian Tong off the ground.
Finally, the telecommunications sector is no exception to the need for guan xi to get things
done in China.
According to the Lieberthal and Oksenberg bureaucratic model for understanding Chi-
nese policy, the fact that semi-autonomous bureaucracies are pursuing competing agendas
which the top leaders then try to satisfy can often lead to inconsistencies in a single policy
statement. This is apparent in Chinese policy towards deregulation and liberalization, and
in particular towards foreign investment in telecommunications services.
On the one hand, general macroeconomic reforms have started introducing competition
to state enterprises. This trend, together with a worldwide shift towards deregulation and
competition in the telecommunications sector has started to erode the MPT's traditional
monopoly. On the other hand, MPT like all monopolists does not wish to give up its
control. Similarly, China has long rejected with suspicion any intrusion of sovereignty such
as is construed by foreign equity or managerial involvement in the country's networks, and
the State Council continues to reiterate the "3 No's" policy on ownership, management,
and operations. But foreign companies are looking for investment opportunities, and their
money is needed. The confusing pattern of reforms emerging in the telecommunications
sector tries to accommodate a number of such conflicting interests.
Rather than replacing or redefining the traditional mandate of the MPT, separation
of the MPT into regulator and operator and the formation of Lian Tong and Ji Tong
have contributed to confusion. Moreover, no comprehensive regulatory and interconnection
guidelines have been set; private investment in the service sector has been tested by many
foreign investors and the rules are bent frequently for one exception or another. While these
trends make sense when we understand these conflicting interests' at play, the results are
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not ideal for the telecommunications industry as a whole.
Mobile communications have seen by far the largest growth in demand, and the most
flexibility in bending foreign investment rules in the past few years. Analog and digital
cellular communications, VSATs, and the paging market have provided foreign investors
with many opportunities to get their foot in the door. While the investments have occurred
largely in coastal regions, the greatest promise for these wireless technologies is in the remote
and sparsely populated regions.
6.3 Institutional Weaknesses and Recommendations
Overall, the sense of the telecommunications infrastructure in China from both within and
outside the country is that the sector is still fraught with a lot of uncertainty. On the
bright side, the scale of plans for telecommunications expansion in the next ten or twenty
years is so large that if China can "get it right," past inefficiencies and problems in the
telecommunications sector will be largely irrelevant. To make this happen, there are several
pressing issues for Chinese policymakers to consider.
Establishing a telecommunications law should be the top priority. Investors, particularly
foreign investors, feel uncertain about the business environment. This may have the effect of
slowing down development. In addition, clearer regulations could improve efficiency in the
system and protect consumers. The basic telecommunications law and regulations together
should address the issues of basic goals, service quality and access, sector structure, pricing
structure, foreign and domestic investment, and certain technical issues such as digital
standards, roaming, and interconnection protocols including pricing,
China is presented with tremendous opportunities to leapfrog over very expensive copper
wire technology in remote and mountainous regions, and go directly to wireless and satellite
use. However, since the primary emphasis in development has been on coastal areas and
large cities rather than rural regions,' China has not given itself the chance to take advantage
of these technologies to their fullest potential. This is partly because universal service is
not a stated target of the MPT, and development in the large and prosperous regions is not
only more attractive to foreign business, but also has a smaller marginal cost and is a more
visible and thus politically attractive goal.
However it is believed that allowing the gap between rural and urban, and core and
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periphery regions to become too large will be detrimental to the goal of economic develop-
ment in the long run. Instead, the government should consider providing some incentives
both for domestic and foreign investors to bring communications technologies to rural and
remote regions. In particular, more attention should be paid to the use of the local loop;
and to the use of satellites for two way communications in addition to broadcasting.
Unlike South Korea and Taiwan which developed their telecommunications systems with
much more foreign aid, China currently does not have the financial resources to pay for its
proposed expansion. As a result the MPT and Lian Tong have faintly hinted that there
will be room for much more foreign investors in the future. Although these investors have
thus far waited patiently for what they view as an inevitable shift away from the ban on
operations, management, and ownership in services, they are unlikely to wait around for-
ever. Already deals are being struck between these same operators and telecommunications
entities in other Asian countries such as Vietnam. The current "policy of exceptions" has
been good for playing potential investors off one another, but this advantage will not last
forever. China should take care that its policies do not continue to breed distrust. If the
goal of telecommunications development is more clearly articulated is "modernization as
fast as possible", then foreign participation in services should be allowed. On the other
hand, if other social goals are to take priority to development as fast as possible, more
attention to rural and remote regions is warranted.
China has been largely following the global trend approved of by organizations such
as the World Bank, towards greater liberalization and restructuring of the telecom sector.
Sector liberalization seems inevitable now that the MPT has been split and Lian Tong and
Ji Tong formed. This is appropriate given the present need for resources that the MPT does
not have; however the MPT needs to be stronger about adopting a legal and regulatory
framework right away. However, China's current approach fails to take advantage of new
technologies and economies of scale. A move towards a market guided sector actually
requires more, rather than less, institutional structure than currently exists.
The use of mobile communications is to be encouraged, especially now in inland and
remote regions. For the coastal and more prosperous cities where demand is quickly out-
stripping the supply of radio frequency spectrum, a switch over to a digital system is the
most viable option. Of the standards available, CDMA appears most suitable for dealing
with China's biggest problem- need for capacity. However, GSM has made a bigger dent
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in the market, and is thought of as a more proven technology. Ideally, CDMA could move
into all of the markets so that everyone ran on the same standard. As this is unlikely to
happen, telecommunications officials need to work on specific rules for the integration of
the two systems in the country.
Use of satellites for public voice networks is often overlooked in favor of digital com-
munication. However, two-way communications is considered a much greater need than
one-way broadcasting for people living in remote regions. Designing mesh-shaped rather
than star configuration network could help make the systems more usable by reducing delay.
In general, more should be done to promote the kind of development happening with the
public satellite link in Tibet.
6.4 Future Study
There are still many unknowns about the Chinese telecommunications sector.
One interesting issue which has been studied very little is the spatial implications of
telecommunications development. In particular, a detailed study involving fieldwork to
determine whether urban-rural disparities in access to telecommunications promotes migra-
tion, and how is needed. A better understanding of the rural-urban gap and how it both
affected by disparities in access to telecommunications technology would help the Chinese
government make more informed policy choices about where and how to invest.
A close examination of China's basic telecommunications law is needed once it has been
completed. This law should be analyzed especially for its ability to clarify current confusion
for foreign and domestic investors. In addition, it will be interesting to see how rights are
defined and allocated by this law.
Also needed is a plan to deal with the problems of interoperability with which China
is imminently faced. Proposing feasible and specific nationwide standards for switching
equipment and for mobile communications would be invaluable for the sector. This research
would be quite difficult for someone other than a Chinese national to carry out, however,
because the necessary data is difficult if not impossible for others to attain.
A more comprehensive cross-country comparison of the "universal service" concept
would be instructive in China's dilemma of how to meet its growing demand, and whether
it should try to do so all at once.
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Finally, while there are already many consulting companies carrying out market studies
on different aspects of the Chinese telecommunications sector, the opportunity and need
still exists for many other such analyses.
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